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THE U.C.C. SECTION 4-205(2) PAYMENT/DEPOSIT WARRANTY:
ALLOW A DRAWER TO HOLD A DEPOSITARY BANK LIABLE FOR
COLLECTING AN ITEM WITH A FORGED INDORSEMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
Now is an exciting time for students and practitioners of commercial
law. The gradual evolution of the Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter
"UCC" or "the Code"] has recently culminated in major revisions.' Hardly an
Article remains unscathed.' New Articles were created in response to rapid
changes in the conduct of commerce. For example, new U.C.C. Article 4A
was drafted in an effort to cope with technological advances in electronic
transfers of funds,' and to provide a basis for adjudicating disputes arising
from this form of payment4 where none had existed at common law.' The
uniform laws dealing with negotiable instruments6 were likewise amended.7
1. See generally Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Introduction to the Uniform Commercial Code
Annual Survey: Some Observations of the Past, Present, and Future of the U.C.C., 41 BUS.
LAW. 1343 (1986) (describing the history of the drafting effort); Daniel E. Murray, Revised
Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A Friendly Critique, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV.
337 (1992) (describing new provisions and contrasting them with prior Articles 3 and 4);
Edward L. Rubin, Policies and Issues in the Proposed Revision of Articles 3 and 4 of the
UCC, 43 Bus. LAW. 621 (1988)).
2. See Frederick H. Miller, Analysis of New UCC Articles 3 and 4, C664 ALI-ABA 259
(1991) (for an overview of the provisions that were amended in the most recent drafting
effort).
3. U.C.C. § 4A-102 cmt. 2 ("The funds transfer governed by Article 4A is in large part a
product of recent and developing technological changes.").
4. Id. at cmt. 3 ("In the drafting of Article 4A, a deliberate decision was made. . . to treat
a[n] [electronic] funds transfer as a unique method of payment to be governed by unique
rules that address the particular issues raised .... [and] to assign responsibility, define
behavioral norms, allocate risks and establish limits on liability .... ).
5. Id. at cmt. 2 ("Before . . . Article [4A] was drafted there was no comprehensive body
of law - statutory or judicial - that defined the juridical nature of a[n] [electronic] funds
transfer or the rights and obligations flowing from payment orders. Judicial authority with
respect to [electronic] funds transfers is sparse, undeveloped and not uniform.").
6. U.C.C. arts. 3 & 4.
7. Article 3 was entirely rewritten in 1990. See generally Patricia L. Heatherman, Good
Faith in Revised Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Any Change? Should There Be?,
29 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 567 (1993) (for background commentary on the changes in the prior
statute effectuated by the revision). See also Donald W. Garland, A New Law of Negotiable
Instruments: Revised Article 3 of the U.C.C., 109 BANKING L. J. 557 (1992); William H.
Lawrence, Kansas Adopts Revisions to Article 3 of the Uniform CommerJial Code, 61 J.
KAN. B.A. 21 (June 1992).
Certain provisions of Articles 1 and 4 as they related to the process of check collections
were also amended. See Robert G. Ballen, et al., Commercial Paper, Bank Deposits and
Collections, And Other Payment Systems, 46 Bus. LAW. 1521, 1552-56 (1991) (listing the
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As the drafters explained, the old laws8 could not "adequately address the
issues of responsibility and liability as they relate to modern technologies now
employed and the procedures required by the current volume of checks"9
being processed annually. 0
One such procedure, which evolved to accommodate certain commercial
depositors who accumulate large numbers of checks during the course of their
businesses, involves the use of "lock boxes." Generally speaking, there are
two situations in which lock boxes are employed. First, institutions receiv-
ing a large daily volume of checks on a daily basis may direct payment to a
post-office box, for which the depositary bank is responsible."' Apparently,
significant changes made to Article 4); Miller, supra note 2, at 267-70 (reviewing the changes
made to Article 4).
8. This Comment will cite to the pre-revision, 1962 version of Articles 3 and 4 with the
letters "PR" following the Article designation. For example, pre-revision section 4-205 would
be cited as U.C.C. § 4PR-205.
9. Revised Article 3, Prefatory Note, Purpose of the Drafting Effort, at 2. See also id. at
1 ("Revised Article 3 (with miscellaneous and conforming amendments to Articles 1 and 4)
.... (was] undertaken for the purpose of accommodating modern technologies and practices
in payment systems with respect to negotiable instruments."); Henry J. Bailey, New 1990
Uniform Commercial Code: Article 3, Negotiable Instruments, and Article 4, Bank Deposits
and Collections, 29 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 409 (1993); Fred H. Miller, U.C.C. Articles 3, 4,
and 4A: A Study in Process and Scope, 42 ALA. L. REV. 405 (1991) (providing an excellent
discussion of the history of the drafting efforts); Garland, supra note 7, at 558 ("The objectives
of the redraft were to replace archaic terminology, make Article 3 more relevant to today's
business transactions, and to recognize that notes and drafts have different functions as to
merit different treatments."); Ballen, supra note 7, at 1556:
The revision [of Articles 3 and 4] serves the underlying purposes and policies of the
Uniform Commercial Code by clarifying and modernizing the law governing negotiable
instruments and bank collections, by encouraging the expansion of modern practices
concerning the negotiation and collection of checks and other instruments, and by
resolving conflicting lines of authority, thereby promoting greater uniformity in the
law among various states.
10. In the early 1950s, about 7 billion checks were handled for collection. By 1987, that
number had swollen to an estimated 48 billion. See Revised Article 3, Prefatory Note, Purpose
of Drafting Effort, at 1; U.C.C. § 4-101, cmt. 2 ("In 1950 ... 6.7 billion checks were
written annually. By ... 1990 ... annual volume was estimated by the American Banker's
Association to be about 50 billion checks."); Id. at cmt. 1 ("The great number of checks
handled by banks and the country-wide nature of the bank collection process require uniformity
in the law of bank collections."); Donald W. Garland, A New Law of Deposits and Collections:
Revised Article 4 of the UCC, 110 BANKING L.J. 51, 51 (1993).
11. See Vincene Verdun, Postdated Checks: An Old Problem With a New Solution in the
Revised U.C.C., 14 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 37, 80 n.174 (1991):
Lock box operations are used by payees who are institutions that handle a substantial
volume of checks. The payee sends the checks daily to the processing facility where
the check is MICR encoded with the amount of the check and the depositary bank
code. That information is electronically transmitted to the payor bank. If there are
sufficient funds in the drawer's account, an electronic transfer is made from the drawer's
account to the payee's account.
[Vol. 28:3
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these depositing institutions routinely failed to indorse the checks. 2 Under
prior Article 4,13 depositary banks could become holders of the unindorsed
items for collection purposes if the bank placed some sort of statement on the
item "to the effect that the item was deposited by a customer or credited to his
account.' 4 Since the banks could provide missing indorsements, one can
imagine that businesses accumulating large amounts of checks would be
tempted to deposit them without indorsements. The second situation where
lock boxes are used is where a bank has made loans to a business or other
institution and wishes to exercise greater control over the collection of pay-
ments.' 5 Pursuant to an agreement, the borrower would instruct its custom-
ers to send their checks to the lock box for the collecting bank to process.'
6
Because the borrower is the named payee on all these checks but never came
into possession of the checks, it obviously could not indorse them. In either
situation the depositary banks found themselves encumbered with the time-
consuming responsibility of supplying the missing indorsements.
The drafters of the revision recognized that such a chore is largely mean-
ingless.' 7 Accordingly, revised U.C.C. section 4-205(1) accommodates this
practice. It eliminates the need for the depositary banks to print anything on
unindorsed items because they become holders upon receipt. 8 Additionally,
the drafters created a new warranty in paragraph two that runs from the de-
positary bank taking items for collection to a number of parties, including the
12. U.C.C. § 4-205 cmt. ("It is common practice for depositary banks to receive unindorsed
checks under so-called "lock box" agreements from customers who receive a high volume of
checks.").
13. U.C.C. § 4PR-205.
14. U.C.C. § 4PR-205(1).
15. James J. Cunningham, Introduction to Secured Lending and Commercial Finance, 681
PLI/CoMM 21, 31 (1994) ("A lender can utilize a 'lockbox' arrangement to have greater
control over collections.").
16. Here the borrower instructs its customers to make payments to a post office box to
which the borrower does not have access. Only the collection bank has access to the
post office box. The collection bank may be the lender itself (if it is a bank) or a
different financial institution. The collection bank removes the collections from the
post office box and deposits them in a bank account of the lender, on a daily basis.
The proceeds are then applied to pay down the line of credit.
Id.
17. See U.C.C. § 4-205 cmt. ("No function would be served by requiring a depositary bank
to run these [unindorsed checks] through a machine that would supply the customer's
indorsement... ").
18. U.C.C. § 4-205(1). See infra section Ill(A) for the full text of the statute. See also
U.C.C. § 4-205 cmt. ("Paragraph (1) provides that the depositary bank becomes a holder
when it takes the item for deposit .... Whether it supplies the customer's indorsement is
immaterial.").
Spring 1995]
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drawers of the checks. 19 Essentially this warranty imposes an obligation on
the depositary banks to either pay or deposit the proceeds of the item to the
benefit of the bank's "customer.
20
As written, the new section 4-205(2) Payment/Deposit Warranty may
provide a new theory upon which to hold a depositary bank liable for handling
a stolen check for the benefit of a thief. This Comment will propose that the
word "customer" as used in U.C.C. section 4-205 should not be read to include
a thief that steals a check, forges an indorsement, and transfers the item to a
depositary bank for collection. Such a reading would allow the drawer of the
stolen check to sue the depositary bank for breach of warranty. This Comment
will first describe the existing recourses available to the drawer against the
drawee bank,2' and the depositary bank. 22 Second, it will analyze section 4-
205(2) according to traditional and familiar rules of statutory construction in
order to show that a new cause of action has been created by Revised Article
4 of the U.C.C. 23
II. EXISTING DRAWER'S RECOURSES
A drawer of a check may suffer an injury at the hands of a wrongdoer in
a number of ways. The case law is replete with instances of faithless, embez-
zling employees who "pad the payroll," induce an employer to issue checks
to real or imagined payees and thereafter keep the proceeds, or otherwise dupe
the hapless employer. 24 The following paragraphs trace the drawer's exist-
ing rights against its drawee bank and the depositary bank that accepted the
item for collection from the forger.
A. Drawer's Recourses Against the Drawee Bank
In reviewing the drawer's recourses against the drawee bank, it is perhaps
simpler to begin by reviewing what the drawer cannot do. The drawer cannot
bring an action against the drawee bank for statutory conversion of the instru-
19. See U.C.C. § 4-205(2). See also infra section Ill(A) for the full text of the warranty.
20. See id.
21. See infra section II(A).
22. See infra section II(B).
23. See infra section III.
24. Cases dealing with the malfeasance of an employee include: Sun 'N Sand, Inc. v.
United California Bank, 582 P.2d 920 (Cal. 1978); Fireman's Fund Ins., Co. v. Security
Pacific National Bank, 149 Cal. Rptr. 883 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978); Brighton, Inc. v. Colonial
First National Bank, 422 A.2d 433 (N.J. Super. 1980), aff'd, 430 A.2d 902 (N.J. 1981).
Indeed, almost every case cited in this Comment dealing with commercial law arose because
of dishonest employees.
[Vol. 28:3
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ment, 5 as (i) such an action is expressly precluded by the Code,26 (ii) there are
conceptual difficulties with allowing the drawer to sue in conversion, 7 and
(iii) the drawer has other, more efficient remedies available.2 8 Neither can the
drawer bring an action for any existing presentment or transfer warranty.29
The usual remedy for a drawer injured by the drawee's mistaken pay-
ment over a forged indorsement is essentially a breach of contract action for
reaccrediting of the drawer's account.30 The Code permits a drawee bank to
debit the depositor's account after it has paid an item according to the
depositor's order, i.e., an item which is "properly payable."'" An item is
properly payable if the depositor has authorized payment to the individual
presenting the item for payment.32 Expressly permitting the drawee bank to
25. The drawee bank may be a statutory converter. U.C.C. § 3-420(a) ("An instrument is
also converted if ... a bank makes ... payment with respect to an instrument for a person not
entitled to enforce the instrument or receive payment [i.e., a thief]."). The bank making
payment, or the "payor bank," is defined as the drawee. U.C.C. § 4-105(3).
26. U.C.C. § 3-420(a)("An action for conversion may not be brought by (i) the issuer [the
drawer].").
27. See U.C.C. § 3-420 cmt. 1 ("There is no reason why a drawer should have an action in
conversion. The [stolen] check represents an obligation of the drawer rather than the property
of the drawer."); AMF, Inc. v. Algo Distributors, Ltd., 369 N.Y.S.2d 460, 464 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1975) ("In order to establish a cause of action for conversion ... the plaintiff must
demonstrate legal ownership or an immediate superior right of possession to a specific
identifiable thing...").
28. See U.C.C. § 3-420 cmt. 1 (A drawer should not have a cause of action for conversion
because "[t]he drawer has an adequate remedy against the payor bank for reaccredit of the
drawer's account for unauthorized payment of the check."); Stone & Webster Engineering
Corp. v. The First National Bank & Trust Co., 184 N.E.2d 358, 362 (Mass. 1962). See also
infra notes 55-60 and accompanying text for details.
29. The transfer warranties of U.C.C. § 4-207 and § 3-416 run only to transferees of the
instrument. The drawer is a person who issues the instrument. U.C.C. § 3-105(a). The
drawer is always a transferor, never a transferee. Therefore, the transfer warranties do not
run to the drawer. Under U.C.C. § 4-208(a) and § 3-417, the presentment warranty runs only
to the drawee bank, not the drawer.
30. Stone & Webster, 184 N.E.2d. at 363 ("The drawer can insist that the drawee reaccredit
his account with the amount of any unauthorized payment."); Ambassador Financial Services,
Inc. v. Indiana National Bank, 605 N.E.2d 746, 751 (Ind. 1992) ("The drawer's remedy for
improper payment [of a check over a forged indorsement] is to obtain reaccredit of his account
from the drawee bank in the amount of the improper payment."); Fireman's Fund, 149 Cal.
Rptr. at 889 n.5 ("Absent its ratification or negligence, a drawer can demand that the drawee
reaccredit its account on the ground that a check bearing a forged drawer's signature is not
'properly payable' within the meaning of code section 4-401(1).").
31. U.C.C. § 4-401(a) ("A bank may charge against the account of a customer an item that
is properly payable..."); Wilder Binding Co. v. Oak Park Trust & Savings Bank, 527 N.E.2d
354, 357 (I11. App. Ct. 1988) (Under [U.C.C.] section 4-401, the [drawee] bank may charge
against a customer's account only those items which are 'properly payable."').
32.See U.C.C. § 4-401 cmt. I ("An item is properly payable from a customer's account if
the customer has authorized the payment ... ").
Spring 1995]
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debit their depositor's accounts for any items which are properly payable
implies that such banks cannot debit their depositor's accounts for items not
properly payable.33 A negotiable instrument bearing a forged indorsement is
not a properly payable item. 4 Therefore, a drawer whose check was paid over
a forged indorsement may sue a drawee bank for wrongful payment.
This having been said, an action by a drawer against a drawee bank for
reaccrediting of the drawer's account is no easy feat. There are a number of
defenses a drawee bank may raise that will operate to prevent the drawer from
shifting the loss to the bank.35 First, the drawer may be held to have ratified
the unauthorized signature.3 6 Second, there are a number of defenses that, if
warranted by the factual circumstances, make the forger's unauthorized sig-
nature "effective," thereby converting an item not ordinarily properly payable
to one that is properly payable.37 If the bank can establish one of these circum-
33.Ambassador Financial , 605 N.E.2d at 751 ("[Under U.C.C. 4-401] A drawee bank
may debit a drawer's account for any items that are properly payable. By negative implication,
section 4-401 denies the drawee bank the right to charge amounts not properly payable.")
(citations and quotations omitted).
34. U.C.C. § 4-401 cmt. 1 ("An item containing a ... forged indorsement is not properly
payable."); Wilder Binding , 527 N.E.2d at 357 ("A forgery is obviously an unauthorized
signature that is not properly payable by the [drawee] bank in the first instance."); Fireman's
Fund, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 889 ("The code provides that as between the drawee bank and the
depositor, losses from a forged or unauthorized signature are borne by the bank since payment
not made pursuant to directions of a 'properly payable' order cannot be charged to the
depositor's account."); Ambassador Financial, 605 N.E.2d at 751 ("Checks bearing forged
indorsements are not properly payable.").
35. See generally James Stuart Bailey, Comment, Allocation of Loss for Forged Checks
Under Articles 3 and 4 of the U.C.C. and the Proposed Revisions Thereto, 22 PAC. L. J. 1263
(1991); John W. Hinchey, An Analysis of Bank Defenses to Check Forgery and Alteration
Claims Under Uniform Commercial Code Articles 3 and 4: Claimants' Negligence and Failure
to Give Notice, 10 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1 (1982).
36. U.C.C. § 3-403(a) ("An unauthorized signature may be ratified for all purposes of this
Article."); U.C.C. § 1-201(43) ("'Unauthorized' signature means one made without actual,
implied, or apparent authority and includes a forgery."); U.C.C. § 3-403 cmt. 3 ("The last
sentence of subsection (a) allows an unauthorized signature to be ratified."). The District
Court for the Northern District of Mississippi has held that drawer of a check who sent the
check to his wife in California in order to start a joint business had arguably ratified the
wife's indorsement, and could not sue the drawee bank for a reaccrediting. Polles v. FDIC,
749 F. Supp. 136, 142 (N.D. Miss. 1990).
37. The first of these defenses is the Imposter Rule. See U.C.C. § 3-404(a) ("If an imposter,
... induces [the issuance of the check to the imposter] ... an indorsement... by any person
[including a forger] in the name of the payee is effective."). The second is the No-Interest
Rule. See U.C.C. § 3-404(b)(i) ("If (i) [the wrongdoer procuring issuance of the check] . . .
does not intend the person identified as payee to have any interest in the [check] .... An
indorsement by any person [including a forger] in the name of the [designated] payee ... is
effective."). The third is the Fictitious Payee Rule. See U.C.C. § 3-404(b)(ii) ("If. . . (ii) the
person identified as payee of [the check] is a fictitious person, . . . (2) An indorsement by any
person in the name of the [designated] payee ... is effective.").
[Vol. 28:3
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stances, it will be relieved from liability for wrongful payment of a check
bearing a forged indorsement.3 8 Third, there are a number of defenses involv-
ing the drawer's own negligence in allowing the forgery to occur.3 9 If any of
these defenses are established, the drawer will be precluded from asserting the
forgery against the drawee bank.n0 If, however, the drawer can show the bank
was also negligent in paying the checks with the forged indorsements, then the
Code allocates the loss between them based on comparative negligence prin-
ciples.4' Last, there are a number of common-law defenses which supplement
the statutory defenses.4 2
38.In Shube v. Cheng, 596 N.Y.S.2d 335 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993), someone purporting to be
the payee of a check induced an agent of a drawer to issue a check to him at a real estate
closing. The court held that this imposter's indorsement of the check was "effective." Id. at
339. In Northbrook Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Citizens & Southern National Bank, 361
S.E.2d 531 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987), a bookkeeper fraudulently issued company checks to real
persons whom the bookkeeper intended to have no interest. The court held that her
unauthorized signature was "effective," and the company-drawer could not maintain an action
against the drawee bank for reaccrediting. Id. at 533. In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. NCNB National Bank of North Carolina, 695 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), an
employee of the drawer-company submitted false invoices and induced the company to issue
checks to a nonexistent, fictitious company. The court held that the employee's signature
was "effective," and that the drawer-company could not maintain an action against the drawee
bank for reaccrediting. Id. at 164.
39. See U.C.C. § 3-406(a) (dealing with negligence of drawer that "substantially contributes"
to the forgery); U.C.C. § 4-406 (dealing with drawer's negligence in failing to examine his
bank statement for evidence of forgeries); U.C.C. § 3-405 (dealing with drawer/employer's
negligence in selecting and/or supervising an employee having "responsibility" for the company
checkbook who forges signatures).
40. See U.C.C. § 3-406(a) ("A [drawer] whose failure to exercise ordinary care substantially
contributes ...to the making of a forged signature ...is precluded from asserting the
... forgery against [a drawee bank]."); Dubin v. Hudson County Probation Department, 630
A.2d 1207, 1211 (N.J. Super. 1993) (holding that drawer who (i) waited several months
before destroying or shredding blank, unused checks from a closed account, and (ii) whose
agent responsible for guarding the checks left them unattended in a place accessible to the
public committed negligence which "substantially contributed" to the forgery; drawer was
therefore precluded from asserting the forgeries.); U.C.C. § 4-406(d) ("If the bank proves
that the customer failed [to examine his account statement for evidence of forgeries], the
customer is precluded from asserting against the bank ... [the customer's forged signature].");
Simcoe & Erie General Ins., Co. v. Chemical Bank, 770 F. Supp 149, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(holding that drawer was negligent in examining account statement and was precluded); U.C.C.
§ 3-405(b) (if employee entrusted with "responsibility" for checks makes a fraudulent
indorsement, the employee's signature is "effective.").
41. See Julianna J. Zekan, Comparative Negligence Under the Code: Protecting Negligent
Banks against Negligent Customers, 26 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 125 (1992); New Negligence
Rules in Revised UCC May Spur Settlements on Forged Checks, 55 BBR 270 (Aug. 13,
1990).
42. For example, some jurisdictions allow a depositary bank to raise the so-called Intended
Payee defense. See Ambassador Financial, 605 N.E.2d at 752 ("The intended payee defense
is ...aimed at preventing a drawer from being unjustly enriched by recovering for an
improperly paid check when the proceeds of the check in fact were received by the payee
Spring 1995]
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If the drawee bank establishes any of these defenses, the drawer's right
to recovery of moneys subtracted from his account and paid out over a forged
indorsement will be severely restricted,4 3 if not eliminated altogether. 44 One
fact pattern that could very well lead to the successful assertion of one of these
defenses against a drawer may be found in the Official Comment to U.C.C.
section 3-406. There the drafters have included a number of examples in-
tended to illustrate when the Drawer's Negligence defense might apply. The
second example reads as follows:
An insurance company draws a check to the order of Sarah Smith in pay-
ment of a claim of a policyholder, Sarah Smith, who lives in Alabama.
The insurance company also has a policyholder with the same name who
lives in Illinois. By mistake, the insurance company mails the check to the
Illinois Sarah Smith who indorses [forges] the check and obtains pay-
ment.
41
Under these circumstances, the insurance company is likely to admit its
mistake and issue a new check to the Alabama Sarah, who was never paid the
proceeds of her policy. 46 Thus, the payee would drop out of the litigation
picture, leaving the insurance company to assess its recourses under the
U.C.C. against other parties.47 Assuming Illinois Sarah's indorsement was not
authorized by Alabama Sarah, Illinois Sarah's indorsement is a forgery.48 The
insurance company's bank had no right to charge the insurance company's
intended by the drawer and the drawer suffered no damages caused by the improper payment.").
43. If the drawee bank can assert any defense detailed in note 40 above, then the operation
of comparative negligence will reduce the drawer's recovery.
44. If the drawee can establish any of the defenses detailed in notes 37 and 38 above, the
drawer will be precluded altogether from recovery.
45. U.C.C. § 3-406 cmt. 3, Case #2.
46. See U.C.C. § 3-420 cmt. 1, which states that in a situation where:
the check was mailed to an address different from that of the [true] payee and was stolen
after it arrived at that address[,]... the drawer of the check [normally] intends to pay an
obligation owed to the payee. But if the check is never delivered to the payee, the obligation
owed to the payee is not affected. If the check falls into the hands of a thief who obtains
payment after forging the signature of the payee as an indorsement, the obligation owed to
the payee continues to exist after the thief receives payment .... [T]he payee's right to
enforce the underlying obligation is unaffected ....
47. Except the Illinois Sarah. It should go without saying that the drawer may sue the thief
directly, if the thief can be brought to trial. Frequently, thieves disappear after committing
their crime. Direct suits against the wrongdoer are beyond the scope of this Comment, which
is limited to discussing the drawer's ability to shift the loss to the depositary bank.
48. See U.C.C. § 3-406 cmt. 3, Case #2, which stipulates that Illinois Sarah's indorsement
is a forgery. "Unauthorized" signatures are considered forgeries under the Code. See U.C.C.
§ 1-201(43) ("Unauthorized signature means one made without actual, implied, or apparent
authority and includes a forgery.") (quotations omitted); U.C.C. § 3-403 cmt. 1 (suggesting
that unauthorized signatures constitute forgeries).
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checking account.4 9 Therefore, the insurance company may bring an action
for wrongful payment and seek a reaccrediting. For the sake of tracing the
usual route of litigation, assume that the insurance company attempts to do so.
This fact pattern was included in the Official Comment to section 3-406 as an
example of drawer's negligence which a finder of fact could determine had
"substantially contributed" to the making of the forgery.5 0 For the sake of this
discussion, let us assume this is the case, and the drawer-insurance company
is precluded from asserting the forgery against the drawee bank. Let us fur-
ther assume that the drawee bank has committed no negligence in accepting
and paying the forged check.51 Under these circumstances, the insurance
company may not recover from the drawee bank, and must look elsewhere in
order to pass the loss to a different party. The only parties remaining are the
collecting banks, including the depositary bank.52
B. Drawer's Recourses Against the Depositary Bank
There has been much scholarly and judicial debate over the question
whether a drawer of a stolen and forged check may bring an action against a
depositary bank that accepted the check for collection.53 Over the years, draw-
ers have attempted to sue depositary banks on a number of theories, includ-
ing conversion, negligence, and breach of warranty. However, attempts to
sustain such actions are generally fraught with difficulties.
1. Conversion
There are only meager possibilities for a drawer to hold the depositary
bank liable for conversion. Although like the drawee bank, a depositary bank
49.422 A.2d at 438, aff'd, 430 A.2d 902 (N.J. 1981) ("[A] drawee bank may not properly
debit the account of a customer whose check bears the forged indorsement of a payee.").
50. See U.C.C. § 3-406 cmt. 3, Case #2 ("[Under the facts presented] the trier of fact could
find that the insurance company [i.e., the drawer] failed to exercise ordinary care when it
mailed the check to the wrong person and that the failure substantially contributed to the
making of the forged indorsement.").
51. Under U.C.C. § 3-406(b), if the drawer can prove that the drawee bank was also
negligent, they will share the loss each to the extent to which their individual negligence had
contributed to the forgery. See also U.C.C. § 3-406 cmt. 4 which states:
Subsection (b) differs from former Section 3-406 in that it adopts a concept of
comparative negligence. If the person ... asserting the preclusion [i.e., the drawee]
failed to exercise ordinary care and that failure substantially contributed to the loss,
the loss may be allocated between the two parties on a comparative negligence basis.
52. The Code defines a collecting bank as any bank handling an item except a payor bank.
See U.C.C. § 4-105(5). This includes a depositary bank. See U.C.C. § 4-105(5).
53. See the cases cited below in sections II(B)(i) - (iii).
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is subject to liability for statutory conversion, 54 the revised Code forecloses
the possibility of the drawer suing for conversion of the item.5 5 Similarly, a
drawer cannot maintain a cause of action for conversion of the proceeds of the
check, which the depositary bank handles on behalf of its depositor. It is well
settled that when a customer deposits money into his account, title to the
money passes to the bank.5 6 The drawer loses all title and interest.57 To
maintain an action for conversion under the common law,5 8 the aggrieved
party must have title to the allegedly converted property.5 9 Drawers simply
do not have sufficient interest in the proceeds their drawee banks pay out over
forged indorsements to maintain a cause of action for conversion.
60
54. U.C.C. § 3-420(a) ("An instrument is also converted if... a bank ... obtains payment
with respect to the instrument for a person not entitled to enforce the instrument or receive
payment."). Depositary banks are "collecting banks" that obtain payment under U.C.C. § 4-
105(5).
55. See supra notes 27-29. See also U.C.C. § 3-420 cmt. I ("Under former Article 3, the
cases were divided on the issue of whether the drawer of a check with a forged indorsement
can assert rights against a depositary bank that took the check .... There is no reason why a
drawer should have an action in conversion.").
56. E.g., Goralsky v. Taylor, 571 N.E.2d 720, 722 (Ohio 1991) ("Money deposited in a
bank becomes the property of the bank."); Aspinall v. United States, 984 F.2d 355, 358 (10th
Cir. 1993) ("[W]hen money is deposited into a bank account, title to the funds passes to the
bank."); United States v. Citizens & Southern National Bank, 538 F.2d 1101, 1105 (5th Cir.
1976) ("A person who places money in a bank on general deposit loses title to the money.");
Town Bank & Trust Co. v. Silverman, 322 N.E.2d 192, 194 (Mass. App. Ct. 1975) ("The
funds on general deposit [with the bank] are property of the bank, not of the depositor.");
Phillips & Jacobs, Inc. v. Color Art, Inc., 553 F. Supp 14, 16 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (depositor loses
title to the money).
57. E.g., Ward v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 489 A.2d 91, 95 (Md. App. 1985) ("The drawer
does not 'own' the funds it has on deposit with the drawee.").
58. The U.C.C. does not set forth the elements which constitute the tort of conversion. The
elements of a claim for conversion are found in principles of common law which supplement
the Code. See Yeager v. Sullivan, 317 N.E.2d 792, 797 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974).
59. E.g., Wilder v. Charles Bell Pontiac-Buick, Cadillac-GMC, Inc., 565 So. 2d 205, 206
(Ala. 1990) ("To maintain an action for conversion, a plaintiff must establish that ... at the
time of the conversion, the plaintiff had a general or specific title [to the converted property].");
Satterfield v. Sunny Day Resources, Inc., 581 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Wyo. 1978) ("In order to
recover damages in an action for conversion, a plaintiff's proof must show that: (a) the plaintiff
had a legal title."); AMF, Inc., Ltd., 369 N.Y.S.2d at 464 ("In order to establish a cause of
action for conversion, two things must be shown; first, the plaintiff must demonstrate legal
ownership or an immediate superior right of possession to a specific identifiable thing...");
Gallimore v. Sink, 218 S.E.2d 181, 183 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975) ("It is clear then that two
essential elements are necessary in a complaint for conversion - there must be ownership in
the plaintiff and a wrongful conversion by the defendant.").
60. In 1990, the California Supreme Court issued an opinion testing the theoretical limits
of an action for conversion. In Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d
479 (1990), the court considered whether a patient could maintain a cause of action for
conversion of tissues and cells that were excised from his body. The court recognized that
"to establish a conversion, a plaintiff must establish an actual interference with his ownership
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Taking a somewhat different approach, the New York courts have devel-
oped a specialized cause of action for conversion of the proceeds of the item
available to drawers under specific circumstances. In Underpinning & Foun-
dation Constructors, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank,6 a faithless accounting
department employee prepared bogus invoices from real payees with whom
the employer did a substantial amount of business. The employee then in-
duced the employer to write checks to pay the fictitious invoices. Later, the
employee would employ a restrictive indorsement stamp similar to the one
used by the real payees, forge the necessary indorsements, and deposit the
checks into his private account. The employer, as drawer of the checks,
brought a suit against the depositary bank for conversion. The court consid-
ered that since the employee never intended for the real payees to have any
interest, the forgeries became "effective" under the No-Interest Rule.62 The
checks were therefore valid orders to the drawee bank authorizing it to debit
the drawer's account.63 However, the depositary bank applied the collected
proceeds in violation of the rubber-stamped restrictive indorsement. The
court held that under these two circumstances, where (a) the payee's unautho-
rized indorsement is "effective" and (b) "the depositary bank has acted in such
a way as to make it liable to the drawer," 64 the drawer has a cause of action
against the depositary bank for conversion.65
or right of possession.... Where the plaintiff neither has title to the property alleged to have
been converted, nor possession thereof, he cannot maintain an action for conversion." Id. at
488. The court went further to hold that since patients retain no ownership interests in excised
cells and tissues, and therefore, the plaintiff could not maintain an action for conversion. Id.
at 489. If a patient cannot sue for the alleged conversion of cells and tissues excised from his
body, neither can a drawer sue for the alleged conversion of money excised from his estate.
See Benjamin A. Appelbaum, Comment, Moore v. Regents of the University of California:
Now that the California Supreme Court has Spoken, What has It Really Said?, 9 N.Y.L. SCH.
J. HUM. RTS. 495 (1992) (for more information on the Moore case); Lisa Mundrake,
Biotechnology and Moore v. Regents of the University of California: The Revolution of the
Future, 13 WHITTIER L. REV. 1009 (1992).
61.386 N.E.2d 1319 (N.Y. 1979).
62.Id. at 1322. The court was considering U.C.C. § 3PR-405(1)(c). See U.C.C. § 3-
404(b)(i)(for the current version of the No-Interest Rule).
63. Forged indorsements made "effective" by an applicable defensive statute become
properly payable. See supra notes 37-38.
64. Underpinning, 386 N.E.2d at 1322. Here the court considered the depositary bank's
act of applying the proceeds of the item to an account in violation of the restrictive covenant
as rendering it liable to the drawer. See Robert G. Ballen, et al., Commercial Paper, Bank
Deposits and Collections, and Other Payment Systems, 45 Bus. LAW. 2341, 2368 (1990)
(suggesting that the Underpinning court allowed the drawer to sue the depositary bank because
the operation of the Fictitious Payee Rule, which places the loss on the drawer, endowed the
drawer with sufficient property interest in the check in order to maintain a conversion action).
65. Underpinning, 386 N.E.2d at 1322.
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Underpinning has been accepted in New York,6 6 but has been limited to
its particular constellation of facts. 67 Few jurisdictions elsewhere recognize
this cause of action.6" Perhaps this theory has not caught on because of the
same theoretical difficulties with allowing drawers to sue for conversion of
the proceeds without either of the "special circumstances" in Underpinning.
Since title to the funds rests with the drawee bank, any funds the depositary
bank handles do not belong to the drawer. 69 It is difficult to fathom how the
drawer's indorsement that was made "effective" by the Code bears any rela-
tion to the drawer's ability to bring an action for conversion of the proceeds.
The operation of U.C.C. section 3-404 does not wrest title to the transferred
funds from the drawee bank and bestow it in the drawer so as to endow him
with sufficient interest to maintain an action for conversion. Even if his
payee's forged indorsement was made "effective," the drawer does not own
the funds that were transferred. In all, there is little hope for a hapless drawer
to be able to sue the depositary bank for conversion of either the item or the
funds.
2. Negligence
A second theory upon which a drawer has been held to be able to sue the
depositary bank is negligence, presumably for failure to detect the forged
indorsement. The cases are split as to whether the drawer may bring such an
action.7 0 Despite the intermittent support, there are persuasive reasons why
66. Cases which recognize the Underpinning cause of action for conversion of proceeds
against a depositary bank include: Horovitz v. Roadworks of Great Neck, 565 N.E.2d 484,
485 (N.Y. 1990) (recognizing the action, but finding it inapplicable); Olean Area Camp Fire
Council, Inc. v. Olean Dresser Clark, 538 N.Y.S.2d 905, 908-909 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989);
Kings Premium Service Corp. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 496 N.Y.S.2d 524 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1985) (recognizing the action but finding it inapplicable); Spielman v. Mnfrs Hanover
Trust Co., 456 N.E.2d 1192, 1193 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (same).
67. See, e.g., Shube v. Cheng, 596 N.Y.S.2d 335, 337 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (holding that in
general drawer does not have a cause of action against collecting/depositary banks, and
Underpinning applies in only "specific limited circumstances."); Prudential-Bache Securities,
Inc. v. Citibank, 536 N.E.2d 1118, 1123 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that Underpinning should be
narrowly construed to apply only to those cases where the depositary bank accepts the item
presented for deposit in contradiction of a restrictive indorsement; also holding the decision
does not recognize a cause of action for simple conversion or money had and received).
68. For cases which discuss the viability of an Underpinning-type claim in their jurisdictions,
see, e.g., Cairo Cooperative Exchange v. First National Bank of Cunningham, 620 P.2d 1805,
1808 (Kan. 1980) (holding that drawers may bring an action against depositary bank for
collecting an item over a forged restrictive indorsement).
69. See supra notes 56-57.
70. Cases recognizing such a cause of action include: Joffe v. United California Bank, 190
Cal. Rptr. 443, 451 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc. v. City National Bank, 196
Cal. Rptr. 614, 620 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. First National
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a court should reject this action. In general, a depositary bank is under no duty
to examine all indorsements for forgeries. 7' Even in those cases where a
depositary bank was held to be under such a duty, the courts have narrowly
confined it to apply only when "suspicious circumstances" warrant that the
bank investigate further. 71 In 1980, the Superior Court of New Jersey iden-
tified an additional two reasons to reject a drawer's action for negligence.73
First, even if the depositary bank was negligent, this negligence is not the
cause of the drawer's loss, which actually occurs when the drawee wrongly
debits the drawer's account.74 Second, since whenever the drawer is attempt-
ing to assert an action against the depositary bank he is usually foreclosed
from recovering from the drawee bank by the applicability of one of the statu-
tory defenses to an action for reaccrediting the drawer's account, allowing the
drawer to then proceed against the depositary bank circumvents the general
policy of the Code to allocate such losses to the drawer.7 5 When taken
together, there is little hope that a drawer might be able to bring a suit for
negligence against a depositary bank.
Bank of Kenosha, 297 N.W.2d 46, 49 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
But see Fireman's Fund, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 903 (rejecting the notion that the depositary
bank could be liable to the drawer for negligence).
71.Northern Trust Co. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 582 F. Supp. 1380 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd,
748 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1984) (per curiam); J. Gordon Neely Enters, Inc. v. American National
Bank of Huntsville, 403 So. 2d 887 (Ala. 1981); Lasley v. Bank of Northeast Arkansas, 627
S.W.2d 261 (Ark. App. 1982); Trail Leasing, Inc. v. Drovers First American Bank, 447
N.W.2d 190 (Minn. 1989); See Julian B. McDonnell, Bank Liability for Fraudulent Checks:
The Clash of the Utilitarian and Peternalist Creeds Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 73
GEO. L. J. 1399, 1399 (1985) ("[It is a] standard banking practice in computerized systems of
paying all checks below a threshold sum, such as $5,000, without a sight review of the
signatures.").
72. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Center Bank, 275 N.W.2d 73, 75 (Neb. 1979); Sun 'N Sand,
582 P.2d at 935.
73. See Brighton, Inc. v. Colonial First National Bank, 422 A.2d 433 (N.J. Super. 1980),
aff'd, 430 A.2d 902 (N.J. 1981).
74. Brighton, 422 A.2d at 440. This point creates a serious challenge to the establishment
of proximate cause.
75. Id. at 441. The plaintiff in Brighton was precluded from suing the drawee bank because
the forged indorsements were validated under the Fictitious Payee Rule. Id. at 439. See also
U.C.C. § 3-404 cmt. 3:
If a check payable to an imposter, fictitious payee, or payee not intended to have an interest
in the check is paid, the effect of subsections (a) and (b) [making the forged indorsement
"effective"] is to place the loss on the drawer of the check rather than on the drawee or
depositary bank that took the check for collection.
Spring 1995]
13
Scislowski: The U.C.C. Payment/Deposit Warranty
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1995
AKRON LAW REVIEW
3. Breach of Warranty
A third theory upon which the drawer might hold the depositary bank
liable is breach of warranty. At first glance, such a suit may seem impossible
because no existing statutory warranty runs from the depositary bank to the
drawer.7 6 However, some courts have attempted to surmount this difficulty
by proposing that the drawer is the third-party beneficiary of the existing
warranties running from the depositary bank to other parties.77 Other courts
had reached this result by holding the drawer to be an "other payor" to whom
the presentment warranty in pre-revision section 4-207 ran. 78 Under the
Revised Code, the presentment warranties only run to the drawee bank, not to
any other payor. 79 This omission of the words "or other payor" from the
Code's presentment warranties militates strongly against interpreting the
warranties contained in the revision as running to the drawer.8 0 There simply
is little basis in the traditional warranties in the Code for supporting a drawer's
cause of action against the depositary bank for accepting an item bearing a
forged indorsement for collection.
4. A New Recourse in Warranty
As previously indicated, 8' the revised version of Article 4 contains a
76. G.F.D. Enterprises, Inc. v. NYE; Dollar Savings & Trust Co., 525 N.E.2d 10, 20 (Ohio
1988) (A close examination of [the preamended] warranty provisions reveals that neither
presentment warranties nor transfer warranties extend from collecting banks to drawers.").
See supra note 29.
77. See, e.g., Allied Concord Financial Corp. v. Bank of America National Trust and Savings
Assoc., 80 Cal.Rptr 622, 624 (1969) ("On third-party beneficiary principles we think the
benefit of warranties given by a bank which negotiates a check on a forged endorsement
extends by implication to the drawer of the check.").
78. Sun 'N Sand, 582 P.2d at 928 ("[T]he structure of section 4[PR]-207 indicates the Code
contemplates that the drawer of a check is an 'other payor'. . . [and] . . .may, claim the
benefits of the warranties therein created."); Insurance Co. of North Amer. v. Atlas Supply
Co., 172 S.E.2d 632, 636 (Ga. Ct. App. 1970) (holding that the warranty of good title in
section 4PR-207(1) runs to the drawer as an "other payor"); U.C.C. §4PR-207(l) ("Each ...
collecting bank... warrants to the payor bank or other payor. ..") (emphasis added).
79. See U.C.C. § 4-208(a) (providing that various persons "warrant to the drawee [only]
that pays or accepts the draft in good faith that..." etc.).
80. Donald J. Rapson, Loss Allocation in Forgery and Fraud Cases: Significant Changes
under Revised Articles 3 and 4, C812 ALI-ABA 529, 538 (1992) (suggesting that because the
revision stipulates that presentment warranties run only to the drawee bank, and that U.C.C. §
3-417 specifically rejects Sun 'N Sand, all possibilities for a drawer to sue a depositary bank
directly are foreclosed); Miller, supra note 2, at 266 (suggesting that the revision settles the
controversy surrounding the liability of a depositary bank for handling an item with an
unauthorized indorsement by denying the drawer's right to sue on a breach of warranty theory).
81. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
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new82 Payment/Deposit Warranty in section 4-205(2). 83 For the first time a
warranty runs directly to the drawer. The last sentence of the Official Com-
ment, sentence number nine, indicates that the person to whom the amount of
the item was paid, or into whose account the proceeds of the item were depos-
ited, is to be a holder.84 In order to be a holder of order paper, the person in
possession must have obtained the instrument following the necessary
indorsement of the transferor.8 5 Thieves who steal order paper and forge a
necessary indorsement are not holders.8 6 Therefore, the drawer may have a
cause of action against a depositary bank for applying the proceeds of an item
bearing a forged indorsement, to the benefit of a non-holder/thief, if the word
"customer" in code section 4-205(2) is read to mean the holder or owner of the
item. As revised Article 4 was only recently completed and offered to the
states for adoption, there is no litigation directly on point. The following
sections will attempt to show that courts should recognize a new cause of
action by a drawer against the depositary bank that accepts an item for collec-
tion on behalf of a thief, thereby breaching the section 4-205(2) Payment/
Deposit Warranty.
III. ANALYSIS
The interpretation of section 4-205(2) is primarily a task of statutory
construction. The competing interpretations are simple enough to articulate.
In deciding whether a drawer may have a cause of action against a depositary
bank for accepting an item bearing a forged signature, a court may construe
the word "customer" broadly enough to as encompass a number of persons,
including a thief. Alternatively, it may construe the word "customer" nar-
rowly as meaning only the true owner of the item, which necessarily excludes
82. Section 4-205 was entirely rewritten. Compare U.C.C. § 4PR-205 with U.C.C. § 4-
205.
83. See infra section Ill(A) for the full text of the Warranty.
84. U.C.C. § 4-205 cmt., Sentence Number Nine ("This warranty runs not only to collecting
banks and to the payor bank or a non-bank drawee but also to the drawer, affording protection
to these parties that the depositary bank received the item and applied it to the benefit of the
holder.") (emphasis added).
85. See U.C.C. § 3-201(b) ("if an instrument is payable to an identified person, negotiation
requires transfer of possession ... and its indorsement by the [previous] holder.").
86. Morris v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 517 N.E.2d 904, 909 n.7 (Ohio 1988):
One who [takes an item] under a forged indorsement ... cannot be a holder .... Title
does not pass in such a situation because the transferee who takes under the thief's
forged indorsement cannot qualify as a holder... Since the thief lacks the status of a
holder, he cannot effectively indorse the instrument, and his transferee cannot acquire
that status .... Thus, no one in the chain of title which begins with the theft of an order
instrument can attain the status of holder.
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a thief. If the court considering this issue selected the broader construction,
then the depositary bank would not breach the Payment/Deposit Warranty by
accepting a stolen item bearing a forged signature from a thief. Under these
circumstances, it would be reasonable to hold that the text of the U.C.C. does
not authorize a drawer to bring such an action, i.e., that such an cause of ac-
tion does not exist. On the other hand, if the court selected the narrower
construction, then the depositary bank would breach the Payment/Deposit
Warranty for accepting the item, collecting the proceeds, and either paying
them to a thief or depositing them in a thief's account. Under these circum-
stances, the court will have essentially determined that a drawer's cause of
action against a depositary bank indeed exists. The following paragraphs
apply familiar principles of statutory construction to section 4-205(2) in an
effort to persuade a court that may be asked to ponder this question to adopt
the narrow interpretation of the word "customer."
A. Plain Meaning Rule
It is the first and perhaps most elementary principle of statutory con-
struction that "the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought
in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, . . . the sole
function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms. ' 87 In determin-
ing the meaning of the word "customer," a court would first look to the four
corners of the statutory text, giving the words their plain and ordinary mean-
ing. 8 Upon doing so, it will become evident that section 4-205(2) is clear.
§ 4-205. Depositary Bank Holder of Unindorsed Item.
If a customer delivers an item to a depositary bank for collection:
(1) the depositary bank becomes a holder of the item at the time it
receives the item for collection if the customer at the time of delivery was
a holder of the item, whether or not the customer indorses the item, and,
if the bank satisfies the other requirements of Section 3-302, it is a holder
in due course; and
87. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
88. State v. One 1990 Chevrolet Pickup, 523 N.W.2d 389, 392 (N.D. 1994) (When
interpreting a statute, "we begin with the statutory language, and give those words their
plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning."); Smith v. Zufelt, 880 P.2d 1178, 1183
(Colo. 1994) ("In an effort to effectuate the legislative intent, we first look to the statutory
language and give words and phrases their plain and ordinary meaning."); Allstate Ins., Co.
v. Hirose, 884 P.2d 1138, 1140 (Ha. 1994) ("Our duty in interpreting statutes is to give effect
to the legislature's intent which is obtained primarily from the language of the statute.");
Adkisson v. City of Columbus, 333 N.W.2d 661, 664 (Neb. 1983) ("A statute should be
construed so that an ordinary person reading it would get from it the usual, accepted meaning.");
SUTHERLAND, STAT. CONST. § 46.01 (5th ed. 1992).
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(2) the depositary bank warrants to collecting banks, the payor bank
or other payor, and the drawer that the amount of the item was paid to the
customer or deposited in the customer's account.8 9
This provision expressly states that when a customer gives an item to the
depositary bank, the bank warrants that it has applied the collected proceeds
on the customer's behalf.9 The word "customer" is in turn defined in section
4-104(5) as "a person having an account with a bank or for whom a bank has
agreed to collect items." 9' There would appear to be no logical reason to
re-interpret a word that is already clearly defined in the statute. 92 Since the
statute lacks any textual ambiguity whatsoever, a court might be inclined to
confine its interpretation of the word "customer" to the plain meaning of sec-
tion 4-104(5). 9'
According to this construction, there is no controversy. The statute says
"customer." If the thief deposited the stolen check with a depositary bank
where the thief maintains an account, the thief obviously constitutes the
bank's "customer."' 94 Even if the thief did not maintain an account with the
depositary bank, the simple act of accepting the check for collection makes
any person, even a thief, a "customer" of the depositary bank under the sec-
ond part of the definition. 95 In either case, simply handling the stolen check
on behalf of the thief makes the thief a "customer" of the depositary bank
whether or not the thief has an account at the bank.96 Therefore, by applying
the plain meaning of section 4-205(2), as modified and further explained by
89. U.C.C. § 4-205.
90.Id.
91. U.C.C. § 4-104(5).
92. Lawson v. Suwanee Fruit & Steamship Co., 336 U.S. 198, 201 (1949) ("Statutory
definitions control the meaning of statutory words.").
93. See Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. Int'l Longshoreman's Ass'n, 457 U.S. 702,
727 (1982) ("The 'common-sense' meaning of a term is not controlling when [the legislature]
has provided... an explicit definition. . . .'Common-sense' and legislative history ought not
to change the meaning of the unambiguous words [defined in] a statute.") (Burger, J., dissenting
opinion).
94. See infra notes 156-60 (cases dealing with the issue whether thieves can be "customers").
95. See, e.g., Marine Midland Bank v. Price, Miller, Evans & Flowers, 446 N.Y.S.2d 797,
799 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (holding that a party, for whom the depositary bank accepted a
check in exchange for the bank's wire transfer to a creditor of the party, constituted a
"customer" of the bank, despite a lack of an account agreement).
96. Under this analysis, the only way the thief could not be a "customer" of the depositary
bank is if the thief had no account, and the bank had not accepted the item for collection
despite a lack of an account. See Papadopoulos v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 791 F. Supp. 72,
74 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that payee of a draft was not a "customer ' because there was
no account agreement and bank had accepted the item for purposes other than'for collection);
Quistgaard v. EAB European American Bank & Trust Co., 583 N.Y.S.2d 210, 213 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1992) (holding that payee of a check who presented the check for acceptance was
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section 4-104(5), a court would in the first instance reach the conclusion that
the depositary bank has not breached the Payment/Deposit Warranty when it
either paid the thief or deposited the proceeds of the check into the thief's
account. A cause of action by the drawer against a depositary bank for tak-
ing a stolen item from a thief would not appear to be warranted by a simple,
cursory examination of the statutory text.
B. Other Sources of Legislative Intent
However, there appears to be a long-standing split of authority as to
whether a court should proceed and consider other sources of legislative in-
tent beyond the words the legislature used if those words appear clear on the
surface. Some courts hold that no other rules of construction are necessary if
there is no ambiguity on the face of the statutory text.97 Other courts hold that
in all cases the Plain Meaning Rule must be applied in the context of a broader
search for legislative intent. 98 The latter position appears to be the more ra-
tional.99 It is the duty of a court examining a statute to discover and effectu-
ate the intent or purpose of the legislature in enacting it.100 Thus, a court must
not a "customer" of the bank, because there was no account and bank had not taken the check
for collection).
97. See, e.g., DeVore v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 884 P.2d 1246, 1251 (Utah 1994) ("Only
when we find ambiguity in the plain language of the statute need we seek guidance from
legislative history and relevant policy considerations.")(citations omitted); State v. One 1990
Chevrolet Pickup, 523 N.W.2d at 392 ("[Only] when a statute is ambiguous... [do we] look
beyond the express language to the purpose of the statute, to the circumstances of its enactment,
and to its legislative history.")(quotations and citations omitted); Austin v. Memphis
Publishing Co., 655 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Tenn. 1983) ("The courts are restricted to the natural
and ordinary meaning of the language used by the legislature within the four corners of the
statute, unless an ambiguity requires resort elsewhere to ascertain legislative intent.");
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) ("Where the language [of a statute] is
plain and admits no more than one meaning, the duty of interpretation does not arise, and the
rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion.").
98.Allstate Ins., 884 at 1140 ("Our duty in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the
legislature's intent which is obtained primarily from the language of the statute. However,
we must construe statutory language in a manner consistent with the purpose of the statute.");
Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condo Ass'n, Inc., 33 Cal. Rptr.2d 63, 73 (Cal. 1994) ("[In
construing a statute,] our primary task is to ascertain legislative intent, giving the words of
the statute their ordinary meaning. The words, however, must be read in context, considering
the nature and purpose of the statutory enactment."); Park 100 Development Co. v. Indiana
Dept. of State Revenue, 429 N.E.2d 220, 222 (Ind. 1981) ("[The Plain Meaning Rule] must
be applied in conjunction with the basic principle that all statutes should be read where
possible to give effect to the intent of the legislature.").
99. Not everyone would agree with this assessment. Justice Antonin Scalia argues that a
court should strictly construe statutes when the legislature's intent is not fully articulated in
order to encourage the legislature to express their intentions more clearly. See Bradley C.
Karkkainen, 'Plain Meaning': Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction,
17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 401, 410 (1994).
100. Conte v. Meyer, 882 P.2d 962, 965 (Colo. 1994) ("In construing statutory provisions,
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determine this intent and construe the text in such a way as to avoid defeat-
ing it.' 0' As the Supreme Court of Rhode Island recently noted, "if a mechani-
cal application of a statutory definition produces an absurd result or defeats
legislative intent, this court will look beyond mere semantics and give effect
to the purpose of the act."'' 0 2 There simply is no way to determine if the
"mechanical" application of the statutory definition of "customer" in U.C.C.
section 4-104(5) produces absurd results or defeats legislative intent other
than by actually looking beyond the four corners of the text to examine the
consequences of that application and other evidences of legislative intent. 10 3
Accordingly, the following paragraphs explore extra-textual sources of leg-
islative intent in order to determine whether a narrow or a broad reading of the
word "customer" in section 4-205(2) best effectuates the statute's purpose.
1. Substance of Official Commentary
The purpose of an enactment may become clear upon examining the
evils or mischief the legislation was designed to prevent. 04 Apparently, de-
positary banks sometimes mistakenly credit the wrong account when gather-
ing checks from customer's lock boxes. 0 Obviously the drawer has a vested
our responsibility is to give full meaning to the legislative intent."); Sorenson v. Colibri
Corp., 650 A.2d 125, 128-29 (R.I. 1994) (In construing a statute, a court must "follow the
principle of statutory construction that [it] must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the
legislature."); Smith v. Zufelt, 880 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Colo. 1994) ("A court's primary purpose
in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly.").
101. E.g., Williams v. State, 853 P.2d 537, 538 (Alaska 1993) ("A court is obliged to
avoid construing statutes in a way that leads to patently absurd results or to defeat of the
obvious legislative purpose behind the statute."); Brennan v. Kirby, 529 A.2d 633, 637 (R.I.
1987) ("A statute or enactment may not be construed in a way that.., would defeat the
underlying purpose."); Adkisson v. City of Columbus, 333 N.W.2d 661, 665 (Neb. 1983)
("The court must look to the object to be accomplished or the purpose to be subserved and
place such construction on the statute that will best effect that purpose, rather than one that
will defeat it.").
102. Sorenson, 650 A.2d at 129.
103. Adkisson, 333 N.W.2d at 644-65 ("A sensible construction will be placed upon a
statute ... rather than a literal meaning that would have the effect of defeating the legislative
intent."); Park 100, 429 N.E.2d at 222 ("It is also well settled that the legislative intent as
ascertained from an Act as a whole will prevail over the strict literal meaning of any word or
term used therein.").
104. Thompson v. State, 524 N.W.2d 160, 162 (Iowa 1994) ("When construing statutes,
we look to the object to be accomplished and the evils and mischiefs sought to be remedied in
order to reach a result which will best effectuate the statute's purpose rather than one that
will defeat it.").
105. For example, in the case Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Boatmen's National Bank of St.
Louis, 13 F.3d 1254 (8th Cir. 1994) the customer and the depositary bank entered into a lock
box agreement where the customer would instruct drawers of checks payable to the customer
to send them directly to the depositary bank. As it so happened, one drawer correctly identified
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interest in seeing that the proceeds are accredited to the intended payee's
account.10 6 The drafters have indicated in the Official Commentary that they
included the Payment/Deposit Warranty in section 4-205(2) to fill the need for
some kind of receipt flowing from the depositary bank to the drawer to indi-
cate that the depositary bank correctly disposed of the collected proceeds.0 7
No such receipt existed under the prior version of the code.
If the word "customer" were construed broadly enough to mean any
person with an account at the depositary bank, then the depositary bank would
not breach this warranty for incorrectly disposing of the collected proceeds.
If the depositary bank took the proceeds of the item and accredited any ac-
count at random, then by definition it has "deposited the item to the
customer's account."' 08 Any account is a customer's account. If the word
"customer" were construed broadly enough to mean any person having an
account with the bank, then in effect the Payment/Deposit Warranty would
become a promise that the depositary bank applied the proceeds to any ac-
count, not the correct account. In this case, the drawer could not hold the
depositary bank liable for incorrectly disposing of the proceeds of the item,
thereby depriving such drawer of the intended benefits of the Warranty. Such
a result is absurd, and should not be tolerated, 09 as this construction obviously
defeats the purpose of the section 4-205(2) Warranty.
On the other hand, if the word "customer" were construed narrowly so
as to refer only to the holder or true owner of the item, then the drawer could
hold the depositary bank responsible for depositing the proceeds into the
the customer as payee, but recorded the wrong lock box account number on the check it sent
to the depositary bank. Rather than depositing the proceeds to the identified payee-customer's
account, the bank deposited the proceeds into the wrong account identified by the erroneous
lock box number. The Circuit Court held that bank's payment of proceeds of the customer's
check to the wrong account constituted negligence as a matter of law. Id. at 1259.
106. Since the payee has not received the collected proceeds, it can be argued that he has
not been paid to his satisfaction under U.C.C. § 3PR-603. His right to sue the drawer on the
underlying transaction remains unaffected. See supra note 46. The payee may be tempted to
sue the drawer. See Ronald L. Hersbergen, Banking Law, 49 LA. L. REV. 259, 271 (1988)
("Alternatively, the true owner can forego his action against the payor and collecting banks
and sue the drawer on the underlying obligation."). Thus, the drawer was subject to liabilities
for the depositary bank's mistake.
107. U.C.C. § 4-205 cmt. ("Paragraph (2) satisfies the need for a receipt of funds by the
depositary bank by imposing on that bank a warranty that it paid the customer or deposited
the item to the customer's account.").
108. Id.
109. Conte, 882 P.2d at 965 ("It is presumed that [the Legislature] intends a just and
reasonable result when it enacts a statute, and a construction which leads to an absurd result
will not be followed."); Fleck v. ANG Coal Gasification Co., 522 N.W.2d 445, 454 (N.D.
1994) ("In interpreting a statute we must presume that the legislature did not intend an absurd
or ludicrous result.").
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wrong account, including one belonging to a thief. Since there can be only
one holder/owner of an item, the bank's promise to apply the proceeds to the
"customer's," i.e. the holder/owner's account remains a promise to apply the
proceeds to the correct account. If the bank wrongly deposited the money into
an account of a non-holder, then it would have breached the section 4-205(2)
Payment/Deposit Warranty. This construction effectuates the purpose of the
section 4-205(2) Warranty. A court should therefore construe the word "cus-
tomer" narrowly to mean only the holder or owner of the item.
2. Words Used in Official Commentary
The actual words employed in the Official Commentary to section 4-205
may provide some guidance as to the intended construction of the text.'10
Unfortunately, an examination of the official commentary proves to be incon-
clusive. On the one hand, sentence number eight of the Comment reads
"Paragraph (2) [the Payment/Deposit Warranty] satisfies the need for a receipt
of funds by the depositary bank by imposing on that bank a warranty that it
paid the customer or deposited the item into the customer's account."'I
This language closely mimics the language used in the text of section
4-205(2). "2 This sentence tends to suggest that drafters did not mean "owner"
or "holder" when they used the word "customer" in the text, when part of the
Official Comment also uses the word "customer." It is unlikely that the word
"customer" in the text was merely an oversight, since the drafters used the
same word again in sentence number eight of the comment. The next sen-
tence of the Official Comment, however, is different. Sentence number nine,
states that "the depositary bank received the item and applied it to the benefit
of the holder."' 1 3 Because the text and the previous sentence of the official
comment both use the word "customer," it might appear that the word
"holder" in sentence number nine is merely an anomaly. 14 Against this back-
drop, it is interesting to note that in commenting on the new Payment/Deposit
Warranty, Hawkland paraphrased sentence number nine to read that the de-
positary bank warrants that to the drawer that it "received the item and applied
the proceeds to the benefit of its customer."".5 However, a court could not
110. See SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST. § 52.05 (5th ed. 1992).
111. U.C.C. § 4-205 cmt. (emphasis added).
112. See supra section II1(A) for the full text of the Warranty.
113. U.C.C. § 4-205 cmt., Sentence Number Nine ("This warranty runs not only to collecting
banks and to the payor bank or a nonbank drawee but also to the drawer, affording protection
to these parties that the depositary bank received the item and applied it to the benefit of the
holder.") (emphasis added).
114. Id.
115. HAWKLAND U.C.C. [Rev] § 4-205:03.
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merely ignore the word "holder" in sentence number nine, because of the use
of the word "holder" in paragraph one of the text of U.C.C. section 4-
205(1).'i6 In total, the official comment contains one "customer" sentence and
one "holder" sentence. It is therefor inconclusive whether the drafters
intended to allow a drawer to bring an action against a depositary bank for
accepting an item for collection from a thief.
3. Legislative History
One of the primary resources a court may refer to in searching for leg-
islative intent is of course the legislative history of the statute." 7 The U.C.C.
is in actuality only a model which the American Law Institute ("ALI") has
created and proposed to the individual states for their adoption. It is a reason-
able assumption that most state legislators are not experts in commercial law.
Consequently, they tend to consider entire articles as a single piece of legis-
lation to be passed or defeated as a whole." 8 Hence, there has been little leg-
islative comment on any individual section of either revised Articles 3 or 4.
The legislative processes of the individual states do not provide any evidence
whatsoever of the intended effect or operation of the section 4-205(2) Pay-
ment/Deposit Warranty.
4. Intent of the Drafters
Examining the actual drafting process of section 4-205 yields better
results. Although such indirect evidence of the intent of the drafter of a stat-
ute carries less weight than the intent of the actual lawmakers who enacted it,
a quick inspection of the drafting process may nevertheless provide an insight
to the meaning of the text. 19 Perhaps this is especially true when the draft-
116. See infra section III(C).
117. Cheshire Mortgage Service, Inc. v. Montes, 612 A.2d 1130, 1139 (Conn. 1992) ("In
seeking to discern [legislative] intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, [and] to the
legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment."); Long Beach Police
Officer's Ass'n v. City of Long Beach, 759 P.2d 504, 508 (Cal. 1988) ("To discern legislative
intent, we must examine the legislative history and statutory context of the act under scrutiny.").
118. See Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1291 (7th
Cir. 1986) ("The UCC is one of the most carefully assembled statutes in American History. It
was written under the guidance of a few people, all careful drafters, debated for a decade by
the American Law Institute and committees of commercial practitioners, and adopted en bloc
by the states.").
119. Parsons v. Jefferson-Pilot Corp., 426 S.E.2d 685, 689 (N.C. 1993) ("The [official]
commentary to a statutory provision can be helpful in some cases in discerning legislative
intent."); United States National Bank of Oregon v. Boge, 814 P.2d 1082, 1090 (Ore. 1991)
("Although the Official Comments lack the force of law, they are instructive, because [i] the
legislature took note of them at the time of adoption, [ii] because they are consistent with the
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ers of the statute, being a collection of independent specialists in commercial
law, are much more knowledgeable than the legislators. Revising Articles 3
and 4 was largely the responsibility of Professors Robert L. Jordan and Wil-
liam D. Warren. 2 ° These men were assisted in their efforts by the Drafting
Committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws.'' After working on the project for four years, the drafters finally pro-
duced a rough draft for consideration by the full membership of the ALI at
their 67th Annual Meeting.'22 The section of the proposed final draft dealing
with U.C.C. section 4PR-205 is significant to the discussion at hand.2 3 The
proposed amended version of section 4-205 contained in that draft reads as
follows:
§ 4-205. DEPOSITARY BANK HOLDER OF UNINDORSED ITEM
If a customer is a holder of an item that is delivered to a depositary bank
for collection
(1) the depositary bank becomes a holder of the item at the time it
receives the item for collection, whether or not the customer indorses, and,
if it satisfies the other requirements of Section 3-302, it may be a holder
in due course; and
(2) the depositary bank warrants to subsequent collecting banks, the
payor bank or other payor, and the drawer that the amount of the item was
paid to the customer or deposited to the customer's account. 12 4
The first thing that should be noted about this draft is the preamble.2 5
Section 4-205 is designed as what logicians refer to as a conditional statement.
structure of the UCC, . . and [iii] because the purpose of the Official Comments is to promote
uniform construction of the UCC."); See also Donald J. Rapson, Deficiencies and Ambiguities
in Lessors' Remedies Under Article 2A: Using Official Comments to Cure Problems in the
Statute, 39 ALA. L. REV. 875, 876 (1988) ("The Comments must be utilized in order for the
statute to be fully understood."); McDonnell, Purposive Interpretation of the Uniform
Commercial Code: Some Implications for Jurisprudence, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 795, 800 (1978).
120. See 66th Annual Proceedings of the American Law Institute, Report of the Director
at 480 (1989) ("Closely related to the project on Article 4a is a proposed revision of Articles
3 and 4 of the UCC. This work is also the responsibility of Professors Jordan and Warren.").
121. Id.
122. See 65th Annual Proceedings of the American Law Institute at 434 (1988) (Remarks
of William D. Warren: "The work on the Article 3, Article 4, and Article 4A project began in
early 1986."). The revisions were finally approved by the ALI at the 67th Annual Meeting in
1990. Proposed Final Draft of UCC Changes Approved by American Law Institute, 54 BBR
920 (May 28, 1990).
123. See Klein v. Murtagh, 355 N.Y.S.2d 622, 625 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974) (the court turned
to an examination of a preliminary draft of a statute in an effort to discover legislative intent).
124. U.C.C. § 4-205 (Proposed Final Draft, April 12, 1990).
125. Referring to the introductory statement beginning with the phrase "If a customer is a
holder."
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A conditional statement is an idea that finds expression in English sentences
constructed according to an "if ... then" format. 126 This section operates once
the "if' part of the conditional, called the antecedent,127 becomes true. In other
words, under this provision, the depositary bank becomes a holder under
paragraph one and makes the Payment/Deposit Warranty under paragraph two
only if the customer depositing the item was a holder. Notice that this section
could be read as providing that the depositary bank makes the section 4-205(2)
Warranty only when it takes the item from the holder, and not when it takes
the item from a thief or other non-holder.
Unfortunately, there is no record that the members of the ALI debated
the content of section 4-205 at their 1990 meeting.2 8 After this meeting, the
ALI ratified the final version, and the revised articles were eventually
proposed to the states for ratification.129 We can only infer the intent of the
drafters by scrutinizing changes made to the draft.
The most significant change, in the final version involves the phrase "is
a holder of an item." This holder phrase was situated in the preamble, or
antecedent, of the draft. In this position, the holder phrase relates to both
paragraphs. In the final version, the holder phrase was stricken from the
preamble and inserted in paragraph one.130 In this position, the statute must
be interpreted such that the depositary bank becomes a holder of the item
under paragraph one only if the customer who deposited it was also the holder
of the item. Conversely, the depositary bank makes the Payment/Deposit
Warranty to the designated parties irrespective of whether or not the deposi-
tor is also the holder. The bank makes the Warranty under both contingen-
cies, i.e., when the depositor is either the holder or a non-holder, such as a
thief. There is no reason for extending the Warranty, and hence the liability
for breach, to those situations where the depositary bank accepts the item from
a thief if the drafters did not intend that any of the designated parties to whom
the warranty runs could make use of it by suing the depositary bank for tak-
126. G.N. GEORGACARAKOS & ROBIN SMITH, ELEMENTARY FORMAL LOGIc 49 (1979)
("Typically, conditionals in English are statements containing the dyadic connecting word if
... then.") (emphasis in original).
127. Id.
128. Section 4-205 was only mentioned once during the entire four-day meeting, and then
only in passing. See 67th Annual Proceedings of the American Law Institute at 442 (1990)
(remarks of Professor Robert L. Jordan: "[Revised Article 4] has a provision in it which
eliminates the requirement of indorsements when a check is deposited for collection. That is
in Section 4-205.").
129. Proposed Final Draft of UCC Changes Approved by American Law Institute, 54
BBR 920 (May 28, 1990).
130. Compare the draft, supra note 124 and accompanying text, with the statute, supra
note 89 and accompanying text.
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ing an item from a thief. If the drafters wanted to insulate the depositary bank
from the possibility of being sued by one of the designated parties when it
deals with a thief, they would have left the holder phrase in the preamble,
thereby negating the very existence of the Warranty, and hence the liability,
in that situation. By moving the holder phrase, they have indirectly indicated
that they contemplated, expected, and even intended depositary banks to be
subject to liability for breach. This is persuasive evidence in favor of a nar-
row construction of the word "customer" in the text so as to effectuate the
intent of the drafters.
C. In pari materia
Yet a third reason to construe the word "customer" narrowly enough to
be only the holder/owner of the item can be found after considering other
sections of the Code dealing with the same subject matter. Such sections are
relevant because of the principle of statutory construction that the interpreta-
tions of related sections should concur so as to produce a harmonious theoreti-
cal whole.13' Stated conversely, courts should avoid constructions of statutes
that place a provision in conflict with other provisions addressing the same
topic.I32 Accordingly, a perusal of the other sections of the Code that deal with
the subjects which section 4-205(2) addresses is in order.
1. U.C.C. Section 4-205(1)
The statute uses the word "holder" in paragraph one of section 4-205. In
that paragraph, the customer who deposits the check must also be a holder of
the item. 3 3 These concepts are conjoined; both must exist in the particular
13 1. State v. Joubert, 518 N.W.2d 887, 892 (Neb. 1994) ("A series or collection of statutes
pertaining to a certain subject matter, [as well as] statutory components of acts which are in
pari materia, may be conjunctively considered and construed to determine the intent of the
legislature so that different provisions of an act are consistent, harmonious, and sensible.");
State ex rel. Sprynczynatyk v. Mills, 523 N.W.2d 537, 540 (N.D. 1994) ("Statutory provisions
must be considered as a whole with each provision harmonized, if possible."); Van Raden
Homes, Inc. v. Dakota View Estates, 520 N.W.2d 866, 867 (N.D. 1994) ("When faced with
conflicting statutory provisions on the same subject matter, we make every attempt to
harmonize and give meaning to each without rendering one or the other useless.");
SUTHERLAND, STAT. CONST. § 46.05 (5th ed. 1992).
132. Alexdex Corp. v. Nachon Enterprises, Inc., 641 So. 2d 858, 861 (Fla. 1994) (holding
that courts must attempt to reconcile any inconsistencies in conflicting statutes); State ex rel
Boone v. Sundquist, 884 S.W.2d 438, 444 (Tenn. 1994) ("In construing statutes, it is the duty
of the court to avoid a construction which will place one statute in conflict with another;
therefore, the court should resolve any possible conflict between the statutes in favor of each
other, whenever possible, so as to provide a harmonious operation of the laws.").
133. See U.C.C. § 4-205(2) text at section Ill(A).
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factual situation in order for a depositary bank to be deemed a holder of the
unindorsed item. 134 It would be inconsistent to require that a depositary bank
deal with only the owner of the item under paragraph one in order for that bank
to enjoy the benefits of holdership, and then to construe paragraph two in such
a way as to exempt the depositary bank from extending the Payment/Deposit
Warranty, thereby incurring liability for dealing with non-owners. If para-
graph one rewards depositary banks for dealing with the true owners of the
item taken for collection, paragraph two should operate to punish depositary
banks for dealing with non-owners. To formulate a coherent, integrated,
harmonious scheme demanding that the depositary banks deal only with the
true owners of the items they take for collection, a court should interpret the
word "customer" in section 4-205(2) narrowly to mean only the owner or
holder of the item.
2. U.C.C. Section 4-201
Another section of the Code dealing with this subject, i.e., the identifi-
cation of the principal in the agency relationship when a depositary bank
accepts an item for collection, is U.C.C. section 4-201. Under paragraph (a),
the depositary/collecting bank is "an agent or sub-agent of the owner of the
item." 3 5 For the most part, this principle is affirmed by the cases consider-
ing it.136 It would be inconsistent to consider a depositary bank as an agent of
the owner of the item for the purpose of determining agency during the col-
lection process under section 4-201 and then to consider the same bank as act-
ing on behalf of a "customer," i.e., a non-owner/thief, during the collection
process under section 4-205.1'3 To integrate the interpretations of these two
134. See id.
135. U.C.C. § 4-201(a).
136. See United States v. Sommer Corp., 580 F.2d 179, 183 (5th Cir. 1978); Citizens
National Bank of Englewood v. Ft. Lee Savings & Loan Ass'n, 213 A.2d 315, 317 (N.J.
Super. 1965) ("[A] collecting bank is presumed to be an agent of the owner of the item unless
a contrary intention appears."). But see Yoder v. Cromwell State Bank, 478 N.E.2d 131, 134
(Ind. Ct. App. 1985) ("The U.C.C. provides that a collecting bank acts as an agent on behalf
of its customer who presents items for collection.").
137. In Knesz v. Central Jersey Bank & Trust Co. of Freehold, 477 A.2d 806 (N.J. 1984),
the Supreme Court of New Jersey considered and ultimately rejected an analogous argument
that a bank should not be considered a "representative" who deals with an instrument on
behalf of one who is not the true owner for the purpose of determining if it should enjoy the
immunity granted by U.C.C. § 3PR-419(3) to comport to the rule in § 4PR-201 that a depositary
bank is an agent of the owner of the item. See 477 A.2d at 810. The court argued that §§
3PR-419(3) and 4PR-201 "contemplate" different sorts of "agency" under different
circumstances, and apparently that a determination that a depositary bank may act as a
"representative" of a thief that was inconsistent with § 4PR-201 was acceptable. Id. Such an
argument would not be available here, as both §§ 4-205 and 4-201 "contemplate" the depositary
bank's actions on behalf of the depositor during the initial stages of the collection process. A
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sections, a court should interpret the word "customer" narrowly to mean only
the owner/holder of the item.
3. U.C.C. Section 3-602
A third section that bears on the question here can be found in Part 6 of
Article 3. The section 4-205(2) Warranty is partially a payment warranty. 38
Under certain circumstances, a depositary bank may make final payment of
the item to the depositor. 39 Under U.C.C. section 3-602, a bank may only pay
a person who is entitled to enforce the instrument. 4 ' A bank which wrongly
pays a person not entitled to enforce the instrument violates its account agree-
ment with the drawer, and subjects the bank to various liabilities. 4' The code
defines a "person entitled to enforce" as simply the holder of the item. 4 2 In
order for the depositor to be a holder of order paper, the depositor must be in
possession of the paper, and the paper must bear the proper indorsement
indicating the bank must pay the person in possession. 143 Only the prior holder
or his agent can place the necessary indorsement on the item in order to make
the next possessor, such as the depositor, a holder.' a In the case of stolen
determination that a depositary bank could act on behalf of a thief under § 4-205 would
produce unacceptable dissonance with § 4-201.
138. See U.C.C. § 4-205(2) ("the depositary bank warrants ... that the amount of the item
was paid to the customer... ").
139. BRADY ON BANK CHECKS, T 15.4, 15-7 (Henry J. Bailey ed., 6th ed. 1987) (indicating
that a bank which accepts an "on us" item makes final payment of the item in the 3-602 sense
when the provisional credit extended to the depositor becomes final after the bank's midnight
deadline). See also Pracht v. Oklahoma State Bank, 592 P.2d 976, 979 (Okla. 1979) (holding
that drawee bank that also acts as depositary bank may be held accountable on, i.e., has
finally paid, the drawn on and deposited in the bank if it failed to timely revoke the provisional
credit); Dozier v. First Alabama Bank, 363 So. 2d 781, 783 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978) ("Final
payment occurred because the [depositary/drawee] bank failed to return the ["on-us"] item or
send notice of dishonor before its midnight deadline.").
140. U.C.C. § 3-602(a) ("an instrument is paid to the extent payment is made ... (ii) to a
person entitled to enforce the instrument.").
141. The drawee who has mistakenly paid a person not entitled to enforce is immediately
subject to an action by the drawer to reaccredit the account. If the drawer bounces other
checks because of the wrongful payment, the bank may be subject to an action for wrongful
dishonor.
142. U.C.C. § 3-301 ("'Person entitled to enforce' an instrument means (i) the holder of
the instrument").
143. U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (defining a holder of a negotiable instrument that is payable to an
identified person as that identified person, if that person is also in possession of the item).
144. Maryland Industrial Finishing Co., Inc. v. Citizens Bank of Maryland, 642 A.2d 317,
322 (Md. App. 1994) (holding that since negotiation of an instrument requires any necessary
indorsement, a party receiving the check over the unauthorized indorsement of someone other
than the true payee cannot be a holder); Humberto Decorators, Inc. v. Plaza National Bank,
434 A.2d 618, 619 (N.J. Super. 1981) ("A proper negotiation of the instrument require[s] the
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order paper, the prior holder has not properly indorsed the item over to the
thief. The thief's forgery of the true owner's indorsement does not operate
to negotiate the paper to the thief. 45 The thief cannot be the holder of stolen
order paper, 146 and is not a person entitled to enforce the instrument.147 There-
fore, a thief cannot be paid under section 3-602.148
If the thief takes the stolen draft directly to the drawee bank and depos-
its it into his account, the drawee bank cannot "pay" the item to the thief under
3-602. If the word "customer" in section 4-205(2) were interpreted broadly
enough to include a thief, then the Warranty would not be breached in this
same situation, where the thief takes the stolen draft directly to the drawee
bank and obtains "payment" when the drawee bank provides a firm, non-re-
vocable credit. If this construction were adopted, the drawee bank, acting in
its capacity as the depositary bank, would in effect be allowed to pay the thief
under section 4-205(2), an act forbidden by section 3-602. In order to inte-
grate the operation of these two sections, a court should construe the word
"customer" in section 4-205(2) narrowly to mean only the owner or holder of
the item. That way, the drawee bank acting as a depositary bank would be
consistently subjected to liability for paying a thief under both sections.
payee's indorsement."); Wright v. Bank of California, National Ass'n., 81 Cal. Rptr. 11, 13
(Cal. Ct. App. 1969) ("Endorsement of... a check is necessary for the negotiation thereof.").
145. Morris v. Ohio Casualty Ins., Co., 517 N.E.2d 904, 909 (Ohio 1988) ("An unauthorized
signature does not operate as the signature of the named payee and, accordingly, may not act
to pass title to an instrument."); Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. v. First National Bank &
Trust Co. of Greenfield, 184 N.E.2d 358, 361 (Mass. 1962) (holding that transfer of an item
from a thief/forger to collecting bank is not a negotiation due to the lack of the necessary
indorsement of the payee).
146. See DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL LAW, 599
(3d ed. 1993) ("By definition, a holder must have at least two things: possession of the
instrument and good title thereto.") (emphasis in original); Id. at 601-02 (no possessors of the
stolen check payable to payee's order containing the forged payee's indorsement are holders.
This includes the thief.).
147. Santos v. First National State Bank of New Jersey, 451 A.2d 401, 411 (N.J. Super.
1982) ("[Since] a forged indorsement is wholly inoperative .... the possessor has no right to
enforce payment by any party to the check."). While the paper is in the thief's hands, the
thief cannot hold anyone on their statutory contracts. The thief cannot enforce the paper
against the drawer, as the drawer owes his obligation only to a person entitled to enforce the
paper. See U.C.C. § 3-414(b). The thief cannot hold any prior indorsers, because their
obligation to pay the draft runs only to a person entitled to enforce. See U.C.C. § 3-415(a).
The thief cannot hold the true owner because the true owner did not actually place his signature
on the paper. See U.C.C. § 3-401(a). Finally, the thief has no legal right to take the paper to
the drawee bank and receive payment, as the item bearing the unauthorized signature is not
properly payable.
148. Champion International Corp. v. Union National Bank, 325 S.E.2d 656, 657-58 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a defalcating employee who was not in possession of the CDs
was not a holder, and bank that paid him violated its account agreement with the drawer to
pay only the holder).
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D. No Superfluous Language
One of the elementary canons of statutory construction is that a court
should construe a section in such a way as to avoid rendering any of the words
superfluous. 4 9 As the Supreme Court of Hawaii stated in 1993:
It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that courts are bound, if
rational and practicable, to give effect to all parts of a statute, and that no
clause, sentence, or word shall be construed as superfluous, void, or insig-
nificant if a construction can be legitimately found which will give force
to and preserve all [the] words of a statute. 50
Thus, in interpreting U.C.C. section 4-205(2), the court must construe the
words the drafters employed so as to give it legal effect. On its face, section
4-205(2) creates a new warranty, and presumably subjects the warrantor, the
depositary bank, to liability for breach. If the word "customer" appearing
therein were interpreted broadly according to the definition in U.C.C. section
4-104(5) to include a thief, then the warranty would have no legal effect. By
definition, a depositary bank can only take an item for collection from a per-
son for whom it has agreed to collect the item, whether or not such a person
has an account with the bank. Thus, a drawer's account will eventually be
debited at the end of a chain of events that always begins when the depositary
bank agrees to collect an item for a person.' 5 ' In all cases where the drawer's
account was wrongly debited, the depositary bank was acting on behalf of
someone for whom it agreed to collect the item. Therefore, if the section 4-
205(2) Payment/Deposit Warranty were construed as a promise that the de-
positary bank paid the "customer" or deposited the proceeds in the
"customer's" account, the warranty would be breached under no circum-
stances. 5 2 None of the designated parties could hold the depositary bank
liable. Thus, no real liability attaches to the depositary bank by the operation
149. United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1011, 1015 (1992) ("[It is a] settled
rule that a statute must, if possible, be construed in such a fashion that every word must have
some operative effect."); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338 (1979) ("In construing
a statute, we are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word [the legislature] used.");
Progressive Animal Welfare Society v. University of Washington, 884 P.2d 592, 602 (Wash.
1994) ("We will not interpret statutes in a manner that renders portions of the statutes
superfluous.").
150. Franks v. City and County of Honolulu, 843 P.2d 668, 673 (Ha. 1993).
151. Except, of course, in those rare instances where the depositary bank purchases the
item, and thereafter collects the proceeds on its own behalf.
152. Under this construction, the only way the Payment/Deposit Warranty would be
breached would be if the depositary bank sent the item for collection, but did not deposit the
collected proceeds into any account. This result is nearly impossible in the age of computerized
transactions.
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of section 4-205(2). A warranty that can never be invoked is useless. By
construing the word "customer" broadly to include any person for whom the
bank agrees to collect an item, section 4-205 loses all legal effect, and be-
comes a superfluous appendage to the Uniform Commercial Code. Therefore,
a court should construe the word "customer" narrowly to mean only the owner
or holder of the item in order to avoid rendering the section 4-205(2) Warranty
meaningless.
E. Prior Judicial Interpretation of "Customer"
In trying to determine the meaning of a statute, a court may turn to inter-
pretations of other courts directly on point for guidance. As the section is new,
no court has yet directly considered whether a thief can be a "customer" for
the purposes of section 4-205(2). Most cases dealing directly with the issue
of who can be a "customer" within the ambit of section 4-104(5) arise in the
context of determining if the plaintiff has standing to sue a drawee bank for
wrongfully paying a check over a forged indorsement1 53 or wrongful dis-
honor.154 In all of these cases, the courts were asked to determine who exactly
was the drawee bank's "customer." Typically, the courts had a choice be-
tween two potential plaintiffs.'55 In two of cases, the court had to decide
153. See, e.g., United Virginia Bank v. E.L.B. Tank Construction, Inc., 311 S.E.2d 773,
775 (Va. 1984) (holding that where person A deposits money on behalf of person B, person B
is the "customer" entitled to maintain an action for wrongful payment); Swiss Baco Skyline
Logging, Inc. v. Haliewicz, 567 P.2d 1141, 1146 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that plaintiff
could not maintain an action against drawee bank for negligently paying a check because the
plaintiff was not a "customer"); Atlas Building Supply Co. v. First Independent Bank of
Vancouver, 550 P.2d 26,29 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that a copayee could not maintain
an action for wrongful payment of check to other copayee over an unauthorized indorsement
absent a showing copayee was a "customer" of the bank); Columbian Peanut Co. v. Frosteg,
472 F.2d 476, 480 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that a corporation was a "customer" such that it
could sue drawee bank for wrongful payment); First National Bank of Springdale v. Hobbs,
450 S.W.2d 298, 301 (Ark. 1970) (holding that corporate president was the "customer" of the
bank such that he could sue the drawee in his individual capacity for wrongful payment).
154. See, e.g., Scali v. Key Bank of New York, 611 N.Y.S.2d 21, 22 (1994) (holding that
the plaintiff could not maintain an action against drawee bank for wrongful dishonor because
plaintiff was not a "customer"); Agostino v. Monticello Greenhouses, Inc., 560 N.Y.S.2d
690, 691 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (holding that corporation, not the president individually, was
the "customer," and the president could not maintain an action against drawee for wrongful
dishonor); Kesner v. Liberty Bank & Trust Co., 390 N.E.2d 259, 259 (Mass. Ct. App. 1979)
(holding that the corporation, not the treasurer individually, was the "customer" of the bank,
and treasurer could not maintain an action for wrongful dishonor); Sinwellan Corp v. Farmer's
Bank of Delaware, 345 A.2d 430, 433 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975) (holding that the employee, not
the corporation, was the "customer" of the drawee bank, and could maintain an action for
wrongful dishonor), rev'd, 367 A.2d 180, 182 (Del. 1976) (holding that the corporation, not
the employee individually, was the "customer" and employee could not maintain an action
for wrongful dishonor).
155. See supra notes 153-54.
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whether the plaintiff or a thief was the "customer." In Mid-Atlantic Tennis
Courts, Inc. v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co. of Maryland,5 6 a faithless em-
ployee-salesman solicited jobs for the employer, but never informed the
employer of the new customers. The employee then diverted the down pay-
ment checks from the customers to his own account. The court held specifi-
cally that although the checks were intended for the employer, it was not the
drawee bank's "customer" under section 4-104. 5' The court remarked inci-
dentally that the defalcating employee (a thief), who maintained an account
with the bank, was its "customer."'' 5 8 In Federal Insurance Co. v. First
National Bank of Boston, 159 an embezzling agent of the drawer, impersonat-
ing a real person (Mrs. Whitaker), opened a new account in Mrs. Whitaker's
name at the defendant bank. The embezzler then redeemed Mrs. Whitaker' s
stock certificates, and induced the drawer to issue a $40,000.00 check payable
to the defendant bank "a/c Helen Whitaker." The embezzler deposited the
check in defendant bank, then withdrew the funds. Mrs. Whitaker's insurer
attempted to recover the proceeds form the depositary bank on her behalf. The
court held that the embezzler (a thief) was the "customer" of the depositary
bank, not the real Mrs. Whitaker. 6 '
The Mid-Atlantic Tennis Courts and Federal Ins. Co. courts were essen-
tially asked to decide if a plaintiff, not being the thief, was entitled to main-
tain a cause of action against a bank dealing with a thief. Their remarks about
the status of the thief vis-a-vis the banks was not strictly necessary to the
determination of whether the plaintiff was a "customer." As such, these re-
marks are properly classified as dicta. 6 ' Further, as these courts are Federal
District courts, their interpretations of state substantive law' 62 are not binding
on state courts.' 63 As a result, the entire common law embodied in those
decisions construing the word "customer" in section 4-104(5) does not pro-
vide any relevant or binding assistance in construing the word "customer" in
156. 658 F. Supp. 140 (D. Md. 1987),
157. Id. at 143.
158. Id.
159. 29 UCC Rep.Serv. 137 (D. Mass. 1980).
160. Id. at 140.
161. In re Guardianship and Conservatorship of Bloomquist, 523 N.W.2d 352, 357 (Neb.
1994) (holding that a point discussed in a previous case that is not necessary to the
determination of that case or not specifically raised as an issue addressed by the court is
merely non-binding dicta).
162. The U.C.C. is a uniform law that every state has adopted. See Whaley, supra note
146, at 615 ("The UCC is a state statute ..."). Therefore, in deciding a case under the
U.C.C., a Federal District Court is necessarily interpreting a state's substantive law.
163. Berschauer/Phillips Const., Co. v. Seattle School District No. 1, 881 P.2d 986, 991
(Wash. 1994).
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section 4-205(2).
Beyond the above cases applying the definition of "customer" in section
4-104(5), there is other, very famous case law that supports the idea that a
bank may properly act on behalf of a thief. In Knesz v. Central Jersey Bank
& Trust Co. of Freehold,1 64 the depositary/collecting bank had accepted two
checks bearing the forged indorsements of the true owner. The Supreme
Court of New Jersey held that under pre-revision section 3-419(3), 165 a deposi-
tary or collecting bank can act as the "representative" of a party who is not the
true owner of the instrument, 66 so that the bank was immune from a suit in
conversion by the payee. 67 Although the rule in Knesz has been rejected by
the drafters of the revision, 168 the New Jersey court's discussion of the ques-
tion whether a depositary bank can act on behalf of one who is not the true
owner is applicable to the issue at hand. A court interpreting section 4-205(2)
might use this case to reason by analogy. Just as the Knesz court could not
help but apply the plain terms of section 3PR-419(3) and arrive at the conclu-
sion that a depositary bank may act as a "representative" of a thief,169 a court
today may find itself powerless but to apply the plain terms of sections
4-205(2) and 4-104(5) and arrive at the conclusion that a thief may be the
"customer" of a depositary bank. However, like the case law dealing with
section 4-104(5), this decision is not directly on point. It is only tangentially
relevant to the interpretation of the word "customer" in section 4-205(2).
F. Policy Arguments
In determining the meaning of statutory language, courts will routinely
consider the virtues and consequences of each competing interpretation, and
164. 477 A.2d 806 (N.J. 1984).
165. U.C.C. § 3PR-419(3). See U.C.C. § 3-420(c) for the current statement of the law.
166. Knesz, 477 A.2d at 810.
167. See U.C.C. § 3PR-419(3).
Subject to the provisions of this Act concerning restrictive indorsements a
representative, including a depositary or collecting bank, who has in good faith and
in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards applicable to the business
of such representative dealt with an instrument or its proceeds on behalf of one who
was not the true owner is not liable in conversion or otherwise to the true owner
beyond the amount of any proceeds remaining in his hands.
Id. (emphasis added).
168. Compare U.C.C. § 3PR-419(3), supra note 167 with U.C.C. § 3-420(c), text and cmt.
3 (denying the conversion defense's availability to a depositary bank).
169. Knesz, 477 A.2d at 814 ("We are in consequence not persuaded that the underlying
policy served by the common law - the recognition of a single direct action by an owner-
payee against the depositary or collecting bank and the avoidance of circuitous or chain
litigation - overrides the plain terms of § 3[PR]-419(3).").
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select an interpretation that best promotes or least harms the public good. 7 '
In so doing, it is proper to weigh the putative benefits and burdens experienced
by the litigants, the courts, and society as a whole.
1. Culpability.
In asking a court to determine if a drawer may sue the depositary bank
for accepting an item from a thief over a forged indorsement, the drawer press-
ing the issue is attempting to pass the loss caused by the thief onto the bank.
One of the relevant considerations in making that determination is who should
bear that loss. In general, the more culpable person should incur the loss. 7 '
On the one hand, the depositary bank does not have clean hands; it dealt with,
and acted on behalf of a wrongdoer. On the other hand, if the drawer is press-
ing to sue the depositary bank, it will usually be because the drawer has been
precluded from recovering from the drawee bank by the operation of one of
the defenses. 172 Thus, the drawer has likewise misbehaved in some manner.
Both parties seem equally culpable in this matter.
2. Character of the Parties
Since the losses caused by theft tend to be substantial, in considering
whether a drawer may sue a depositary bank and attempt to pass the loss
along, it is relevant to consider which of these parties is better able to absorb
and/or spread these losses. 173 In most cases, the drawer would be an indi-
vidual. In some cases, the drawer might be a corporation or other business
entity. However, in nearly all cases, the bank will be much stronger economi-
cally than the drawer. To avoid shock losses, and to better spread the losses
caused by thievery, a court should interpret section 2-405(2) so as to allow the
drawer his day in court.
170. Wichelman v. Messner, 83 N.W.2d 800, 811 (Minn. 1957) (holding that in construing
a statute, a court must consider the consequences of a particular interpretation, and endeavor
to find a construction that promotes the public interests).
171. See generally David Morris Phillips, The Commercial Culpability Scale, 92 YALE L.
J. 228 (1982).
172. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text discussing defenses.
173. This argument has found favor in Article 2 breach of warranty actions for defective
products. See Spring Motors Distributors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 666 (N.J.
1985) (holding that in general, a manufacturer is a better risk-bearer than an individual, and
should bear the risk of loss from injuries caused by a defective product); Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280, 288 (3d Cir. 1980) ("Courts have
adopted strict liability for cases involving injury to persons or other property in order to place
the cost of such injuries on ... the party best able to distribute the costs."). The argument is
equally applicable in the Article 4 context.
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3. The Policy of the U.C.C. Loss Allocation System
The general scheme of the warranty provisions in the U.C.C. is to place
the loss on the person who could best have prevented the lOSS. 17 4 In cases of
forged indorsements, the net effect of the warranties is to eventually place the
loss on the depositary bank.175 If the drawer were allowed to sue the deposi-
tary bank, and if the drawer succeeds, then the loss would be placed exactly
where the warranty scheme operates to place it. However, if the drawer is
pressing to sue the depositary bank, it will be because the drawer has been
precluded from recovering from the drawee bank by operation of one of the
defenses. The overarching policy of the statutory defenses is to place any loss
partially or entirely caused by the drawer on the drawer. 76 If the drawer
would be allowed to sue the depositary bank under these circumstances, it
would amount to an attempt to circumvent this policy. 7 7 In sum, these con-
174. Menichini v. Grant, 995 F.2d 1224, 1231 (3d Cir. 1993) ("[The Article 3 loss allocation
rules are] premised on the responsibility to exercise ordinary care, [and] proceed from the
principle that liability rests with the party best able to prevent the loss."); Prudential-Bache
Securities, Inc. v. Citibank, 536 N.E.2d 1118, 1121 (N.Y. 1989) ("The Uniform Commercial
Code, in its rules governing check fraud, assigns losses by the relative responsibility of the
parties for the loss. Losses arising out of forged indorsements are allocated to the party best
able to take precautions to prevent them."); See generally Douglas J. Whaley, Forged
Indorsements and the U.C.C. 's Holder, 6 IND. L. J. 45 (1972); Note, Forgeries and Material
Alterations: Allocation of Risks under the Uniform Commercial Code, 50 BOSTON U. L. REV.
536 (1970).
175. McCarthy, Kenney & Reidy, P.C. v. First National Bank of Boston, 524 N.E.2d 390,
392 (Mass. 1988) (holding that the loss caused by a forged indorsement falls on first bank
dealing with the thief by operation of UCC warranties); Great American Ins., Co. v. Amer.
State Bank of Dickinson, 385 N.W.2d 460, 465 (N.D. 1986) (holding that the objective of the
UCC warranty provisions in forged indorsement cases is to place the loss on the depositary
bank because "that party is in the best position to verify and obtain the necessary
indorsements."); Robert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, A Theory of Loss Allocation for
Consumer Payments, 66 TEX. L. REV. 63, 105-106 (1987) (liability for forged indorsement
falls on depositary bank); McDonnell, supra.note 71, at 1404 (strict liability underlying the
UCC warranties allocates losses to the depositary bank as the first taker of the checks with
the forged indorsement from the wrongdoer); WHITE & SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 16 (3d ed. 1988) ("Depositary banks ... are in the best position to prevent certain
kinds of fraud, particularly those involving indorsements.").
176. See U.C.C. § 3-404 cmt. 3 (If a check payable to an imposter, fictitious payee, or
payee not intended to have an interest ... the effect of subsections (a) and (b) is to place the
loss on the drawer .... The drawer is in the best position to avoid the fraud and thus should
take the loss."); U.C.C. § 3-405 cmt. 1 ("Section 3-405 adopts the principle that the risk of
loss for fraudulent indorsements by [responsible] employees... should fall on the employer
rather than the [depositary or drawee] bank."); McCarthy, 524 N.E.2d at 392 (holding that
loss caused by check issued to a fictitious payee is on the drawer); McDonnell, supra note
175, at 1406 (drafters intended that when a defense applies, the drawer should bear the loss
rather than the bank).
177. Hinkle v. Cornwell Quality Tool Co., 532 N.E.2d 772, 779 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) ("A
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siderations cancel each other, and do not provide a court a compelling reason
to either allow or prevent a drawer's suit under section 4-205(2).
4. Judicial Economy
As previously indicated, the usual course of action for a drawer injured
by the payment of a check over a forged indorsement is an action to reaccredit
the drawer's account. 7 8 In such an action, several defenses can be asserted
against the drawer. 7 9 These same defenses may be assertable in a direct ac-
tion by the drawer against a depositary bank for breach of warranty. 8 ° If the
courts were to allow the drawer to assert an action against the depositary
banks after an action for reaccrediting the drawer's account against the drawee
fails, then the drawer would be afforded the opportunity to relitigate issues
relating to the defenses. It is inconsistent with our judicial system's ideal that
every plaintiff be given his single day in court if drawers were allowed to turn
around and sue depositary banks after a suit broaching the same issues fails
against a drawee. 8 ' However, if the word "customer" in section 4-205(2)
were construed narrowly so that the drawer had the option to sue the deposi-
tary bank directly, the drawer may decide not to pursue an action against his
own bank. 182 If the drawer elected to sue the depositary bank, then there would
be no res judicata problems.
direct suit by the drawer against the depositary bank could be viewed as a circumvention of
the statutory scheme.").
178. See supra note 30.
179. See supra notes 37-42.
180. See U.C.C. § 4-208(c) (suggesting that in an action for breach of warranty, "the
warrantor [a collecting/depositary bank] may defend by proving that the indorsement is
effective under Section 3-404 or 3-405 or the drawer is precluded under Section 3-406 or
4-406 from asserting against the drawee the unauthorized indorsement or alteration.").
The cases are divided on this issue. See Franklin National Bank v. Shapiro, 7 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 317, 320-21 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970) (holding depositary bank may employ the Imposter
Rule defense in an action for breach of warranty.); Allied Concord Financial Corp. v. Bank of
America National Trust and Savings Assoc., 80 Cal. Rptr. 622, 625 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969)
(holding that since its liability in a breach of warranty action derives from the liability of the
drawee bank, a depositary bank may assert any defense against the drawer in an action for
breach of warranty that the drawee has); Aprile v. Suncoast Schools Federal Credit Union,
596 So.2d 1290, 1292 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (holding defenses [4-406] are not available
to the depositary bank); Acrometal Companies, Inc. v. First American Bank of Brainerd, 475
N.W.2d 487, 493 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (holding 4-406 is not available to a depositary/
collecting bank).
181. State v. Simms, 881 P.2d 840, 843 (Utah 1994) (holding that the doctrine of Res
Judicata "bars a second adjudication of the same facts under the same rule of law.").
182. McDonnell, supra note 175, at 1413 ("A drawer may hesitate to sue its own bank, for
fear of damaging its banking relationship."); Cooter & Rubin, supra note 175, at 109:
Spring 19951
35
Scislowski: The U.C.C. Payment/Deposit Warranty
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1995
AKRON LAw REVIEW
These considerations, however valid, are counterbalanced by a very
persuasive reason to allow a direct drawer's suit against a depositary bank.
Under the current system, whenever a drawer incurs a loss due to the payment
of an item over a forged indorsement, he or she must first look to the drawee
bank. 8 3 In turn, the drawee bank usually turns to the presenting bank with
which it received the item in order to pass the loss on a breach of presentment
warranty theory. 8 4 The presenting bank in turn looks to the statutory trans-
fer warranties to pass the loss to prior collecting banks. 8 So, too, do these
collecting banks resort to the transfer warranties to pass the loss down the
collection chain until it lands upon the depositary bank. 8 6 This system has
been roundly criticized as circuitous and needlessly time-consuming.'87 If a
court were to interpret the word "customer" in section 4-205(2) narrowly as
to mean only the owner or holder of the item, then a new cause of action by
the drawer directly against the depositary bank will be recognized, thereby
achieving the "short cut" that effectively by-passes the circuitous effects of
the Code's current loss allocation scheme. 188
[W]hile it is convenient to sue one's own bank, certain practical problems can arise.
Financial institutions tend to become irritated when they are sued, and the drawer's
bank can express its irritation by cancelling the drawer's accounts, or accelerating
any outstanding loans. As a result, the drawer may prefer to sue the depositary
bank.
183. See supra note 30. See also Cooter & Rubin, supra note 175, at 108:
In the second category of forged indorsement cases, the loss initially falls on the
drawer rather than the payee. Most typically, an employee or family member steals
a check after the drawer has written it, forges the payee's indorsement, and cashes
it. The drawer's right of action, which is for improper payment, lies against the
drawee.
184. Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. v. First National Bank & Trust Co., of Greenfield
184 N.E.2d 358, 363 (Mass. 1962) ("If the drawee recredits the drawer's account and is not
precluded by 4[PR]-406(5), it may claim against the presenting bank on the relevent
[presentment] warranties in 3[PR]-417 and 4[PR]-207.").
185. Id. ("Each transferee has rights against his transferor under [the transfer warranties]
those sections.").
186. See supra note 175.
187. Sun 'N Sand v. United California Bank, 582 P.2d 920, 927 (Cal. 1978) ("The rule
[requiring 'circuitous' litigation] ... sharply conflicts with the objective of avoiding multiple
suits."); Cooper v. Union Bank, 507 P.2d 609, 617 (Cal. 1973) ("Requiring cumbersome and
uneconomical circuity of action to achieve an identical result would obviously run contra the
code's explicit underlying purposes to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing
commercial transactions.") (quotations omitted); Allied Concord Financial Corp. v. Bank of
Amer. National Trust & Savings Ass'n., 80 Cal. Rptr. 622, 624 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) ("The
modern trend of procedure looks on circuity of action with disfavor.").
188. See Stone & Webster, 184 N.E.2d at 362 ("An action by the drawer against the
collecting bank might have some theoretical appeal as avoiding circuity of action.").
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IV. CONCLUSION
There are many reasons why a court should narrowly construe the word
"customer" in section 4-205(2) to mean only the holder or owner of the item.
Although the text of section 4-205(2) may appear clear on the surface, 89
considerations of extra-textual sources of legislative intent reveal that a nar-
row reading best effectuates legislative purpose. 90 A narrow construction is
also warranted to harmonize the interpretation of section 4-205(2) with other
sections of the code dealing with the same subject matter. 9 1 By interpreting
the word "customer" to mean only the holder or owner of the item, a court
would avoid a construction that renders section 4-205(2) superfluous. 92
Although a review of prior case law interpreting the word "customer" does not
aide in the determination of the issue at hand,'9 3 considerations of public
policy on balance militate for a narrow reading. 194
The new sections in the Revision create new opportunities for litigation.
The nascent section 4-205(2) provides a new cause of action by a drawer of
a check against a depositary bank that accepts a check for collection over a
forged indorsement. The arguments assembled in this Comment should as-
sist the commercial law practitioner in persuading a court that a drawer may
now sue a depositary bank for breach of warranty, thereby furthering the
evolving understanding and utility of the Uniform Commercial Code.
RICHARD J. SCISLOWSKI
189. See supra section III (A).
190. See supra section III (B).
191. See supra section III (C).
192. See supra section III (D).
193. See supra section III (E).
194. See supra section III (F).
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